How We Win (3/12/19)

00:00:31 (applause)

Alice Greenwald: Good evening, and welcome. My name is Alice Greenwald, and I'm president and C.E.O. of the 9/11 Memorial & Museum. And as always, it's a pleasure to greet you and to welcome everyone to tonight's program, along with those who are tuning in to our live web broadcast at 911memorial.org/live.

00:00:58 It is a special pleasure for me to welcome Farah Pandith back to the museum. We were honored to have her participate in a public program co-sponsored a few years ago with the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. And during the museum's planning phase, Farah graciously accepted our invitation to be interviewed for what ultimately became our "Reflecting on 9/11" installation. So we thank you, again, for that.

00:01:26 This evening, she will help us consider practical proactive ways to counter extremist ideologies. Despite the years, lives, and billions of dollars spent fighting terrorist organizations, extreme ideas continue to attract adherents and the threat of terrorism, tragically, persists. In dialogue with Gideon Rose, Farah will share powerful but seldom-used strategies for addressing the scourge of global violent extremism.

00:01:57 This happens to be the topic of her newly published book, "How We Win: How Cutting-Edge Entrepreneurs, Political Visionaries, Enlightened Business Leaders, and Social Media... Social Media Mavens Can Defeat the Extremist Threat." And she should know. A leading expert and pioneer in countering violent extremism, Farah Pandith served as a
political appointee under Presidents George H.W. Bush, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama. She was the first-ever representative to Muslim communities for the U.S. Department of State, serving both Secretaries Hillary Clinton and John Kerry.

Under President George W. Bush, Farah was director for Middle East regional initiatives at the National Security Council and chief of staff at the U.S. Agency for International Development's Bureau for Asia and the Near East. She's also served on the Homeland Security Advisory Council, chairing its task force on countering violent extremism. And currently, she is senior fellow at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government and an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Gideon Rose is the Peter G. Peterson chair and editor of "Foreign Affairs," the journal of the Council on Foreign Relations. Prior to this, he was the Olin senior fellow and deputy director of national security studies at the CFR. From 1994 to 1995, Mr. Rose served as associate director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the staff of the National Security Council. He was assistant editor at the bimonthly international affairs magazine "The National Interest" from 1986 to 1987, and at the domestic policy quarterly "Public Interest" from 1985 to 1986.

Following tonight's program, we invite you to stay for a reception, where you will have the opportunity to purchase Farah Pandith's new book, "How We Win", on the day of its release. Without further ado, please join me in welcoming Farah Pandith in conversation with Gideon Rose.

(applause)

Gideon Rose: Thank you very much. This is hallowed ground. We are on sacred space in America. This is tragic ground, where there has also been rebirth and re-creation of a new, a new form of the country and a new national consciousness.
The attacks on 9/11 disrupted American life and American foreign policy, and were an incredible shock to the system. And the initial response, of the first responders and the community here in New York and everybody around the world and in the country, was an outpouring and a rush of love and support, and a kind of visceral community-building effort, to recover, to grieve, to control the immediate damage and so forth. But that was soon followed by a second wave of emotions that essentially replicated and mirrored the attacks.

We were attacked, we lashed out and attacked. We were maimed and tortured, we lashed out and maimed and tortured. We were the subject of othering and binary thinking, and we replicated that, and the war on terror that took place to respond to a real challenge often made that problem worse rather than better.

Almost 20 years on, we can think about how we should have reacted, about how we should have behaved, and what we can and should do now about some of these problems. The psychologist Viktor Frankl is supposed to have said that, "Between stimulus and response, there is a space. In that space is our power to choose our response, and in our response lies our growth and our freedom. What we did with the war on terror, with the invasion of Iraq, was to essentially react rather than respond.

We did a knee-jerk, amygdallic hijacking and capture of the national consciousness. Instead of thinking, "How should we solve these problems?", we took our pain and suffering and mirrored it back. Farah's work shows the alternative path that could have been taken. Farah's work is, essentially, that of somebody sincerely asking, "There is a terrible problem of violent extremism in the world that we are in. It produced the kind of awful terrible attack that destroyed the towers and so much else. How should we understand? What is the war against that that we are fighting? What is the considered, thoughtful, appropriate response to that, and how could and should we defuse that violent extremist project and win that war?"

In some ways, I see your book as a guide to the path not taken that we can and should take going forward. So with that, let me get into the
details. You say this is how we win. What is the fight that we are winning? Who is the enemy and what is the fight?

00:07:28 Farah Pandith: This book is about a very specific kind of enemy, and it's terrorist organizations that use the name of Islam to lure young Muslims into their armies. Now, we all know, there are all kinds of different bad actors in this world. And unfortunately, in the time that we're in today, we're seeing a rise of all kinds of hate, of us versus them. Some of the lessons in this book apply to the rise of neo-Nazis. They apply to a common person experiencing hate in their communities. But what I'm trying to do here is to say exactly what you have just defined.

00:08:09 We cannot win against these kinds of terrorists if the only thing we're doing is preparing a strategy for a physical war, because there is an ideological dimension that we have not focused on.

00:08:23 Gideon Rose: So, it's almost like the... the demand side, and, you know, the growth of the problem... There was that famous Rumsfeld memo of, "Are we..." You know, "We can kill them off, but are we creating more of them than we are killing off?" That if... if that's a net negative result, then the more you do generates... make the problem worse rather than better. So, how do you fight extremism without giving in to it in a way that minimizes and dampens the problem rather than exacerbating and inflaming it?

00:08:51 Farah Pandith: Well, one of the things you have to do is to understand that a strategy needs to be put in place. And a strategy is not, what's the most vital piece of political architecture in the world that we need to go after? Is it this part of the world, is it this part of the world, can we do a little bit over here, and might we do a little bit over there? It's to understand that ideas don't have walls.

00:09:15 They are connected, and so, for me, as I look at, as you said, almost 20 years since 9/11, the path that we have to take requires us to understand: A, that there is an ideological battle that we have to fight, and we need to go all in to fight it; and B, the generation of people that are being lured into armies like ISIS are a very particular demographic--
those kids that have grown up post-9/11, having a very specific experience.

There's something really big that has happened that government has not really understood, nor have average citizens understood, and so when I look at the answers, it's not just about what we need to do in the old Executive Office Building or at the State Department, in terms of... of a strategy that you're writing. It's to understand what's actually happening within cultures to nearly a billion kids that are under the age of 30 around the world.

Gideon Rose: Okay, I totally buy that. Now, let's imagine I'm kind of a woke general. Let's say, you know, a Stan McChrystal-type, right?

Farah Pandith: Sure.

Gideon Rose: I'm a brilliant warrior, who can kill anything in the world, and... But I'm also incredibly empathetic and want to build teams, and want to actually solve the problem, and would prefer not to fight. I know what to do in the kinetic part of the job.

Farah Pandith: Right.

Gideon Rose: How to beat these terrorists, how to find them and track them down. I hear what you're saying, it resonates, I want to do this other stuff, but what does it actually mean in practice? What is the bottom-line program that I could put in place? If I wanted to supplement my kinetic efforts with your squishy stuff, what does that actually mean?

(laughter)
00:10:51 Farah Pandith: So, that squishy stuff is the stuff government doesn't know how to do well, do we? When you go to someone and you say, "We need to talk about the fact "that Muslim millennials that have grown up post-9/11 are having a crisis of identity," people's eyes glaze over. That's too squishy. Emotional stuff, cultural stuff, government is going to do that?

00:11:12 We don't know how to do that. You can tell me how many tanks need to go into a place, you can tell me how many guns I'm going to need, you can tell me how many troops need to go in order to win. You can't measure what you need to do to move someone away from finding an appeal of an ideology. But that doesn't mean we can't figure this out.

It means that the woke generals, even though all of them have said the ideological war matters, don't know quite how to do it at the pace that we need to do it in order to win.

00:11:42 Gideon Rose: Okay, so who does? So, Stan McChrystal says, "I hear that, and that makes sense, so Farah, instead of trying to do what you do, I'm just going to hire you, bring you onto my staff, give you a fancy budget... Now go off and do the stuff that will help be a force multiplier for all my kinetic efforts." What is it that you do that we're not doing?

00:12:01 Farah Pandith: So, in the physical war, we have a chairman of the Joint Chiefs. That person wakes up every day, and that person is responsible for the physical wars that are happening in the world. Who is the person who wakes up every day in our government and says, "How are we doing on that ideological war?" There isn't anyone. There's never been anybody. There is no strategy, since 9/11, to understand all of our assets in the ideological space.

So, while you can say, "It's really important and we need to do more," somebody in government also needs to be responsible for, what are all the things that we have in our tool box that we can actually use, and how much of this do we need to use, and how much of that do we need to use?
Gideon Rose: Okay, so, let's play... Fantasy game continued here, for 200...

(laughter)

Now there is that czar. We've rechanged the structure of American foreign policy, recognized that the post-9/11 reorg didn't really work, so we've done yet another reorg, and there is now an ideological, just like we... When I was at the Clinton administration, the NSC structure worked well to coordinate interests across foreign policy and national security, but they didn't have anything for economic stuff.

Farah Pandith: Right.

Gideon Rose: And so, they created the National Economic Council as kind of a ratchet version of the NSC, to basically do the same kind of thing. And it actually made things better, and was easier to coordinate, and now it's... I mean, it's not the entire thing, but it works. So, now you have not just a National Security Council and a National Economic Council, but you have, like, an ideological czar... You're the ideological czar, with power, plenipotentiary powers to reorient strategy or suggest tying things together. What do you do differently?

Farah Pandith: So, it's important to understand that obviously, both in the Bush administration and in the Obama administration, many conversations like this were happening. What do we do about the organization of this problem that we have? Can we build and fix a way within our inter-agency so that we can solve for the problem? We know we need to do more. We don't have any resources, and that's a different conversation about why Congress hasn't actually put the money into the ideological war that they have into the physical war. That's important to understand.
But it isn't only a problem of structure, it's a problem of credibility. How can you build the kind of antibodies within a community if government is the only one who's playing. You can't, because you can't persuade a young Muslim to believe what the United States government, or any other government in the world, has to say. Young people talk to young people, so it has to be a peer-to-peer kind of thing. And the folks that actually know what's taking place at the grassroots level are, in fact, NGOs that are doing this.

So, what government has to do is that it has to figure out a way to work with the NGOs, and scale the ideas that the NGOs know work at the grassroots level, and make it into a 24/7 machine, just the way the bad guys do on their project. We need to deploy that kind of focus, that kind of attention, and frankly, that kind of experience and money, towards the problem.

Gideon Rose: So, if we did this, what essentially you'd be doing would be to create a sort of counter-ideological force that would be a sort of benign, positive approach to thinking and viewing things that would offer the potentially radicalizable teenagers a choice, rather than just leaving it to the madrassas by default, and the... So, instead of yelling at the Saudis for trying to co-opt, you know, co-opt everybody and convert them, do our own kind of massive version of public education, deradicalization, attempt to sort of... So, while I think about it, it would stop the radicalization process before it gets started? So it would reduce the flow of terrorists?

Farah Pandith: Well, so, one of the things that's important, before we even get there, is to understand, what is it that we're solving for, right? It's not just... There are kids who find this appealing. You have to ask, why? Why do they find this appealing? And one of the things that I think that we haven't unpacked in a way that actually makes sense is that lure of that "us versus them."

It's connected to a crisis of identity that young Muslims have been having all over the world post-9/11, right? So, they're asking questions about what it means to be a modern Muslim, what the difference is between
culture and religion, how can I live my religion out loud. And the weird thing is, it... You know, you can understand that intellectually, but when you see it, it's surprising, because it's not just happening with Muslims that are living in Muslim-majority countries. It's happening with Muslims who are living as minorities, right?

00:16:02 So, both of these, these... This demographic problem, is huge. I told you, there are a billion Muslims under the age of 30. If you understand that it's an identity crisis that we have to try to solve for, the only voices that can help a young person navigate through that can't be the bad guys who say, "I'm going to tell you how to be a better Muslim."

Gideon Rose: That...

Farah Pandith: It's got to be all of the community, right?

Gideon Rose: Yes, yes.

00:16:55 Farah Pandith: Right? So, it can't just be government. It's got to be the other sectors, which is why the czar is important, the inter-agency is important, the money that Congress gives to embassies around the world to work on this project, it's important. But so is the scale, and you can't get the scale on the kinds of things that happen around identity if it's only one sector doing something, and, and we're not allowing the NGOs to be able to do what they know that they can do. That requires a partnership, and a cooperation across three sectors: government, the private sector, as well as regular citizens themselves.

00:17:33 Gideon Rose: Okay, that makes perfect sense, and I see that as a sort of plan to scale up and distribute and maximize the benefits of any intervention you come up with. Somebody does some good program here, it works. You put the entire force of the NGO community, the U.S. government coordinating it, behind it, you do research, you follow it up, and you end up, essentially, crowdsourcing the problem and then following the best ideas out there.
Farah Pandith: Yes.

Gideon Rose: Makes perfect sense. I'm somewhat skeptical about the potential interventions that you can then scale up. I have two teenagers. >>

Farah Pandith: Right.

Gideon Rose: They're living in Park Slope. I can't get them to watch the TV shows I want to watch, read the books I want them to read, listen to the music I want. If I can't do that with my kids in Park Slope, how the hell are we going to do that with, you know, people in Yemen? Changing their preferences and getting them onto the right path that we want them to follow?

Farah Pandith: If it was only people in Yemen, we'd have a different problem on our hands. We have people in Suriname and in Trinidad, we have people in Argentina and Brazil. We have people in Tajikistan and China, in India and Pakistan. Think about the diversity of each of those countries. Think about all of the young people who are growing up through an identity crisis that have all understood that they can connect to what it means to be Muslim-- by their peers-- in a social media platform.

And I'm not going to tell you it's one platform or the other, it's all of them combined. Some people are using Instagram, some people are using Facebook, some people are using, you know, pick your thing. It is the messages they're getting, not from their parents-- because, by the way, your kids aren't going to listen to you.

(laughter)
They're going to listen to their friends, right? They're going to listen to what their friends are doing. What's cool? How does it feel to be a young person today? You're not going to get it from what you're watching in your home. You're getting it from what you're seeing in pictures and in emotion that you're getting from your peer groups.

00:19:25 Gideon Rose: So we're helping their peers?

Farah Pandith: We're helping-- we're basically talent-scouting, around the world, and we're finding young voices that are credible to other young people, and listening to the ideas that make sense for particular nuanced communities. It is not, "All of Brazil needs to do this," or, "All of China needs to do that." It is, "Which neighborhood are we dealing with? What, who are the influencers in that neighborhood?"

00:19:52 And Gideon, I mean, sometimes it's music, sometimes it's art, sometimes it's a theology that's going to drive somebody to move in a different direction. It isn't one thing, it's many things at once, but it is... The requirement is, something has to exist. You can't have a vacuum, that the only place that's being filled is with the bad guys' content. We need content, too.

00:20:15 Gideon Rose: So, this is, like, sort of creating local constructive support groups and networks for at-risk youth around the world, so they get some good influences and constructive support and lean-in circles, or whatever, as well as the same things they are getting in civil society connected to a more radicalized mosque, which gives them the community and belonging they want, and the sense of purpose and meaning, but ties it to a negative project that can be used to blow up buildings.

00:20:44 Farah Pandith: The central point here is that there isn't a monolith that is Islam. There isn't one way of being Muslim. And kids need to understand that they can live their identity out loud in a lot of different ways. And what we are seeing around the world is that instead of that happening, it's... It's going in reverse.
When kids are asking questions about what it means to be modern and Muslim, they're seeing one answer and one uniform way of thinking, and they're picking apart all the diversity, 1,400 years of history that have been pulled apart, so that they only see one way to live their... live their religion in the way they think is pure. And that's problematic for a government, because what that means is that the bad guys can lure them into their armies.

But what does it mean for non-government? It means that you're changing the very nature of what a community feels like, and that's actually the ultimate thing here. One piece of this is, "Can you make America safer?" Let's suppose. "Can you make Canada safer? Can you make the U.K. safer?" Okay, there are questions around terrorist organizations doing bad things. But what we have to understand is, because of the demographics that we're talking about-- a billion kids under the age of 30, who are all dealing with this constant-- all day, every day-- angst, and with bad guys who are there, interested in that angst, and we're not-- that's the problem that we're facing, because we don't even know what is coming.

Meaning, we don't know how these kids are going to decide to live their identity out loud. And what I know is that government is limited in its ability to actually add value at a community level. But it can do some really spectacular things. It can be the convener, and the facilitator, and the intellectual partner with the ideas that we hear on the ground. It can bring attention—America especially-- can bring attention to the ideological war, because when it begins to say it is going to do something, a lot of countries begin to say, "Wait, what is America doing? How, what is the innovation there? What's the creativity?" Where is the partnership with the creatives in America? Where is the designed thinking for the problem that we have?

And most importantly, and this is the thing that absolutely kills me, in the years that I've been working on this... I am, I am not a social scientist, I am, I am somebody who is learning from what I see. And when I talk to people about what I have seen and heard with the identity crisis, people have asked me, "Well, are there behavioral scientists that you're talking to about the human brain?" Because, if a human brain doesn't get
mature until 24, surely government has brought in the social scientists to talk to us about how to disrupt what the kids are seeing. And of course, we have not, because you’ve been in government, too. You and I both know that that does not happen.

So, I want to turn things on its head. I want to say, "If we know "that we can solve this at a local level, and here are all the things that we can do, who are all the actors that we can bring forward to be able to work on this with us?"

Gideon Rose: So, what I hear you saying is, preventing extremism, or deradicalization, takes a village. And in some ways, like, what we're really doing is helping generate the cultural and social... social antibodies to extremism that's going to, essentially, work by creating a healthy immune system... >>

Farah Pandith: Yes.

Gideon Rose: ...in the societies locally that can... so that the individuals involved can fight off the infections of bad, sort of, ideological... Is that sort of essentially...

Farah Pandith: That is essentially what I'm saying, because you can't, you cannot fight this if we're doing it the same old way. We've tried for 20 years to do it, and we have failed.

Gideon Rose: I've got two big caveats, because I think this is fascinating, and I like the idea, and I'd love to do it. Obviously, it sounds like it would be great. One is this, and I think that you're on to something that I think is very important that is different from the way we usually talk about this, which is, you... We talk about the struggle against extremism, or the war on terror, or how to win the fight as if it is a classic binary structure: good guy, bad guy. We fight them, we beat them; it's a symmetrical conflict.
But it's not, really, because what you're talking about is not, let's say, us fighting the Saudis. It's us fighting with the Saudis for control over the next mind space of the developing world's youth.

Farah Pandith: Right.

And so, we're competing with the Saudis for customers, as it were—mental customers—rather than fighting them, and so our efforts... The reason it's important to reframe it like this is, that means our job isn't to fight the Saudi efforts. Our job isn't to stop madrassas, our job isn't to shut down the extremist preachers, necessarily, because that's going to be almost impossible to do. It's to provide...

What you're saying, the way to win is not stopping the other people who we're fighting, but provide a better product, have a better answer, do better efforts of our own, that will provide a more compelling product, an alternative that the clients and customers and developing world's youth will want to choose ours, if they can. Is that basically it?

Farah Pandith: Well, it's important to recognize...

It's a positive, not a negative struggle.

Farah Pandith: It is a positive thing, and I've written this book out of positivity.

Gideon Rose: Right.

I'm not... I do believe that there is a path forward, but I want to say a couple of things. One is, I'm not saying that we can only do this if we fight a physical war. We got that. But you can't only do it if you're only doing the ideological war, right? There is a balance here.
What we have done is, we have a warped system-- it's imbalanced. All we've done is ever really tried and experimented in the physical, in the physical side.

00:26:34 So, if we go to the project of the ideological war, and we think, "How can we do this?", you mentioned Saudi Arabia. I'll come back to that in one minute. The system that's underlying extremism, the thing that allows the us-versus-them ideology to grow, and to make a difference to these young kids who are having a crisis of identity, requires us as government and as regular people to sort of explore, well, what are the planks that are underlying that system, okay?

00:27:07 One of which is the identity crisis, another of which is the kinds of things that countries that we call partners and allies are doing, that are actually, at the end of the day, destroying our ability to... to win over and to build antibodies.

00:27:27 So, in the book, I do talk about Saudi Arabia, and I talk about it because, in every single country I went to as special representative to Muslim communities-- nearly 100 countries around the world-- no matter where I went, this pernicious, violent idea of an us-versus-them and a monolithic Islam was born in many different, different facets. So, it was, it was seen by me with the eradication of cultural history, for example.

00:28:06 Same thing that Hitler did to make sure that you can never remember the past. That he has a new way of thinking about the world, the Saudis have done that to ancient mosques. Translations of the Korans, translations that require us to not see the text, but to see it through their eyes and their perspective of what it means to be a Muslim.

I picked up books in mosques in Leicester, U.K., that would say things like, "All Jews are pigs," okay? The printing of these kinds of materials...

00:28:40 Gideon Rose: Was that a Labour pamphlet?
Farah Pandith: It was a very dangerous... No, it was very, very dangerous to see, right? But it wasn't just in one part of the world, it was everywhere. And so one of the things I want to explore for all of us is to, to look at the kinds of relationship, the relationship we have with Saudi Arabia, and to understand that there is more we can be doing to make sure that the things that we know have to stop do stop.

And it isn't just one thing. It's not just the training of imams, or it's not just the publication of Korans, but it's this effort to make Islam a monolith and to eradicate a sense of diversity within Islam.

Gideon Rose: Okay. Let me give you a question. You have two possibilities. >>

Farah Pandith: Mm.

Gideon Rose: You can do some kind of virus that will screw up the Saudi dissemination program and hurt their efforts at spreading their model, screw up the translations of their books, whatever, right? And stop their efforts. Or you can leave their efforts alone, and you could launch, and be, you know, given the power to launch, and a U.S.-sponsored version of... Our version of it, you know. Flood the world with our versions of things, support networks for the groups, you know, infrastructure for community, whatever. Which would ultimately produce more benefit, do you think?

Farah Pandith: Can I use...

Gideon Rose: Ours matching theirs, or stopping their bad...

Farah Pandith: Can I use the amount of money that they have spent over the last four decades to do it?
Gideon Rose: Yes, yes, equal amounts of money. Equal amounts of money. >>

Farah Pandith: I would still say eradicate what the Saudis are doing.

Gideon Rose: So, their problem in hyping everybody up and radicalizing is actually a hugely significant thing that wouldn't just be countered by our doing our own efforts on the side. We have to both do our own, and counter theirs, as well.

Farah Pandith: And I'm not the only person who has said this.

Gideon Rose: No...

Farah Pandith: Right? So it is, and it isn't in the context, certainly, of the brutal killing of, of the "Washington Post" journalist, Mr. Khashoggi. It's about something much bigger, and I would say that if we don't get a handle on that kind of ideology that's been spread over decades, in a lot of ways that we aren't even tracking, or don't even know, this is where cultural listening actually, Gideon, really matters, right? If we only apply our measurement stick by what might be happening in Morocco because of the Saudis—bad example-- but, you know, let's just pick it because it's... I mean, you can't understand what's really happening. Go to the Tri-Border Area in South America. Go look at ancient cultures in South Asia, and ask yourself, what is it about the experience of being Muslim there now that is so different than it was even 30 or 40 years ago? What's the factor that's changed?

And when you begin to ask that question, you see what I saw and, and what I, what I know to be true. This isn't just a thing that happened recently. This is decades-long. It's very deep and it's very important for all of us to understand. It doesn't mean we can't be partners with the Saudis on other things. It means that we as America need to get serious about the fact that we are putting troops on the ground in places in the world
that are... that we're fighting there because ideology has been building over years that allow other terrorist groups to come in.

And for me, as I look at that, as a former government official, I think it's incumbent upon us to tell every American parent who has a child overseas, ask your government to do more because there's a role for us to be playing as honest brokers on what we're seeing.

Gideon Rose: Would you conditionalize aid to the Saudis on performance in curbing deradicalization? Curbing radicalization?

Farah Pandith: We haven't even begun to experiment on the kinds of things that we can do, right? So when we are thinking creatively about the kinds of ways we can work with Saudi Arabia, one way has always been, we told them they need to do this, they come back and they say, "We're working on it." And then, and then we kind of go to the next year, and we tell them that they need to do something and then they come back and... Or, fun, we write a human rights report that is... The angst that goes through the inter-agency on how much we can really say about what they're doing, and, can we do this, but we need them for that.

Let's just take that off the table for a minute. Because that's, that hasn't been working for us. Let's be more creative about how we do things. So, if, for example, the Saudis tell us that they have, in fact, been working on bringing Korans back that say all these terrible things-- their translations of the Koran-- and there aren't any more Korans out there, which is what you know... They recently will tell you that they've done such a good job.

Gideon Rose: Like a product recall.

Farah Pandith: Yeah. That's what I say in my book, exactly that. If you think you've done such a good... Fine, we'll buy them back-- great. $25 for every Koran that comes back. That's great.
Gideon Rose: Like buying back-- instead of buying back guns, buy back bad Korans.

Farah Pandith: That would be fine.

Gideon Rose: That's a cool idea, actually.

Farah Pandith: Or textbooks, or textbooks.

Gideon Rose: Don't burn them, but just buy them back.

Farah Pandith: Buy them back. If you say that we've done such a good, good job, you know...

Gideon Rose: Put them in a "Raiders of the Lost Ark" warehouse, the big kind of thing at the end.

Farah Pandith (laughing): Exactly, exactly.

Gideon Rose: Giant big warehouses full of Korans. We don't want to burn them.

Farah Pandith: Exactly, exactly.

Gideon Rose: Okay, this... This is interesting stuff.

Farah Pandith: (laughs)
Gideon Rose: The U.S. government was not doing a good job at this stuff in administrations that supposedly cared about it. Now you have an administration that doesn't even care about it. What—and after this... what comes next... What realistic possibility is there that you could teach the United States government to, you know, do empathetic cultural listening? I mean, this is the real world, so if that's your answer, isn't that mean we're just screwed?

Farah Pandith: Well, so, you chose to wear that color suit today because you got all kinds of signals from wherever you go to buy that color suit, okay? Everybody watching us today has little things that they get moved in a particular direction because of little signals that they're getting from the way people analyze behavior and the way we work on the web and how we, you know, go to stores. And all that data is collected and it tells us a really good story about who we each... each of us are.

I believe that in trying to deal with this problem, this phenomenon we're dealing with, we can't just wait for government to suddenly wake up and to say, "Okay, I'm going to really work on this "and we're going to put in a lot of money and this is how..." Because even if we had all the money in the world, government can't do it alone. For the reasons I told you-- we're not credible, all those kinds of things.

But we also don't have the latest information about how people buy things and how they're persuaded. Which is why it's so important for the private sector to actually get involved in this. I see a role for the private sector to play that isn't just about, you know, throwing money at a one-off kind of event that they say that they're trying to fight hate. As great as that would be, and I wish that there would be more of that happening around the world, but there is partnership that can happen between companies that have knowledge about how humans behave and what NGOs are doing on the ground so that their marketing people, and their behavioral analytics, and the way in which they function to move people in a particular, particular direction can be married with what NGOs are actually doing to stop hate.

Now, look, the people who are on the front lines of this are actually non-profit organizations. They work and skimp for every dollar that they get
to keep the lights on and pay salaries, because that's the way NGOs generally work. They go grant to grant, and it's really hard. And they watch beheading videos, and they pay attention to these awful, gruesome things that most of us don't think about all day, every day, because you're not in the space working on stopping a young kid from joining a group like ISIS.

And instead of going to those NGOs and saying, "What can we do to help you do your job better, to scale what it is that you know?" 20 years after 9/11. We know that we have to do far more. What we're doing is, we're, we're saying to the NGOs, "Keep looking for the money that you're trying to get, and try to prove to us that you are going to stop doing this. But, meanwhile, we're going to talk about other things." And I think that there is a mismatch, so when I think about, if I could do anything, how we think about these things, there is a role for government to play in the way in which we described.

But I think that there is a far more creative solution, where government doesn't have agency, doesn't have the kinds of personnel, and the kinds of... I don't want us to start building a brand-new endeavor in government that is going to fix this. There are private-sector companies that do this. Why would we not use them?

Gideon Rose: So I, actually, I really like this, because... I hear you saying three things. One is, don't... This is not primarily a problem that government can solve, certainly not the U.S. government, from the outside. And the efforts to do so aggressively by the U.S. government, in an active, direct way, would be ham-fisted, bureaucratically screwed-up, almost invariably insensitive and politicized, and do more harm than good. So, government has a real role to play, but as a coordinating, directing, and, you know...

Farah Pandith: Yes.

Gideon Rose: ...supervising force, and mobilizing force. Chief community organizer, whatever.
Farah Pandith: I love that.

Gideon Rose: But not the one doing so. Second, that the... All the other players and actors that actually have human connections-- the Track II stuff, the mill-to-mill context, the... all the various... Every single point of contact between society A and society B, not just the official government ones, which are... The kinetic stuff is limited...

00:38:31 Farah Pandith: Right.

Gideon Rose: The government has a monopoly on violence. The government has no monopoly on community building.

Farah Pandith: Right, correct. >>

Gideon Rose: And so, all... Everybody is involved in this project. All of us, not just government. Which is good, because the kinetic stuff, it's all us talking about, "Gee, what can we get our government to do?" But what I hear you saying is, that's part of this, but everything any of us does can be connected to this.

Farah Pandith: Yes.

00:38:50 Gideon Rose: And the third thing, and this is important, is, sure, it's not going to solve the problem, but the problem has been here before, it's going to be here in the future, but every little thing can help. And each... in effect, the problem is the result of lots and lots of freaked-out people doing bad things. And if we can manage to sort of get everybody to chill a little bit, and be tied together in more supportive and benign ways, and create healthier communities in various ways, then that will lower the temperature of everything, and the extremism, and the terrorism, and negative consequences of both, will ultimately diminish.
And so it's not that the best is the enemy of the good. It's any little bit helps, even the small little things, because every step towards greater empathy and connection that helps build real communities and real human relationships eats away at the sources of the extremism that ultimately leads to things like the Twin Towers being knocked down.

Farah Pandith: 100%, and when you talk... You talked about the military-- when you talk to people on the ground in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in places that we have been fighting wars, and you, and you ask about the power of one person doing this, you can, and you know that each of these nano-interventions actually make a difference. It is March 12, and it's almost the anniversary of the Boston bombing. It was two kids who grew up outside of Boston that decided that they were going to do what they did on... at the Boston Marathon. It doesn't take hundreds of bad actors, necessarily, to do something bad. It takes very... it takes one person to say, "I'm going to do something as evil as that."

What I am saying, and what you're rightly saying, is, if we had a different way of thinking about the way in which we're living our lives and what, frankly, we want our communities to feel like, we can actually make a difference in reducing the us-versus-them, which will make a difference. There is no magic wand, there is no silver bullet that is going to fix everything. Hate is not going to go away tomorrow. But we can dramatically reduce the, the appeal so that we can have and we can see fewer armies.

In my, in my work, in these years since 9/11, Gideon, one of the things that was so frustrating to me is that we both know-- you were in government, too-- there are so many serious problems for which we do not have solutions. And we don't know what to do, and it is going to take a hundred years before we can get to a place where we can say we've moved on a particular issue. This doesn't have to be one of those things. So, when I look at... when I look at this...
Gideon Rose: So this is actually hopeful, not because the problem is a good problem, but because, unlike a lot of other problems, which really are insoluble, this one does seem to have interventions that if we only were able to take and scale and redeploy them...

Farah Pandith: Yes.

Gideon Rose: We could actually make some difference in lessening the problem.

Farah Pandith: Yes.

Gideon Rose: So, that's... The hope for making things better is the possibility of making things better...

Farah Pandith: Yes.

Gideon Rose: ...is what creates a hopeful possibility of discussion. Unlike other problems that really are just, "Oh, my God, we have to manage this forever."

Farah Pandith: Right.

Gideon Rose: Okay, so, that's a great... The Boston Marathon one is a wonderful segue to something I wanted to ask you. One part of me says, "I hear everything you are saying. I sympathize, I want this to be true. But it's never going to happen in a foreign policy, and it's more significant and urgent as a homeland security problem. Okay, yeah, I'm upset at radicalization in Suriname, but I'm sure of a hell of a lot more upset about radicalization in Boston."
The Boston Marathon bombers were not out there, they were here. The call was coming from inside the house, in horror movie terms. The radicalization efforts that you are talking about over, abroad, are one thing. How do we do it here? A year and a half ago, okay? A year and a half ago, Sayfullo... Sayfullo Saipov, who was an Uzbek immigrant...

Farah Pandith: Yes.

Gideon Rose: Got radicalized here, and drove a school bus and led it on a rampage and ended up, after being stopped, right outside Stuyvesant. My son was at Stuyvesant that day, and I got a call, "Okay, gee, your, you know, the school has been locked down, potential terrorist attack," blah blah blah. And I thought about this incredible irony, because there is no place in America that represents the openness to diversity, the future of connection to the world, and the hope for an America that lives in peace and harmony with the world beyond its borders than a place like Stuyvesant.

Thousands and thousands of extraordinary immigrants and people from, you know, different backgrounds making their way up to and into the American system, and, and assimilating in the right way. And then you have the... the crazy Uzbek, radicalized immigrant, who represents the mirror image, the doppelgänger, the failed assimilation and incorporation. How do we deal with the Sayfullo Saipovs of the world, who are here? Who are not out there reading bad Korans?

They're, they're... if anybody knew what America is like, it's the people who live here, right? And if they end up blowing up the Boston Marathon, or trying to, you know, school buses and ram things here... How do we stop that in our own society? Why is this a foreign policy problem... If we, if we could do what you are saying, why wouldn't we want to do it here first and and more so?

Farah Pandith: I am really happy you brought up what's happening domestically. Because I think it's really important. We are sitting here on sacred ground. When 9/11 happened, there were 90 countries that were
affected. Here, in this, in this space. And we tend to think of 9/11 as something that is ours, that happened to us. But it happened to the world. And it happened to every religion in the world, every race in the world. We didn't have one kind of person that was attacked when... was killed, excuse me, when we were attacked.

00:45:15 The, the kind of way in which we look at this ideology has to be a sober account of the thing that we're actually dealing with. Ideology that affected that guy, who ran his truck, you know, tried to kill people, or the person at the Boston bombing, or in the nightclub, or in, I mean, how many attacks we've had in our country since 9/11.

00:45:42 Thankfully, nothing like 9/11. But the ideology that motivated those individuals from doing something is not ideology that is over there. It's ideology that is existing within the entire demographic that I'm talking about. That ideology doesn't exist and is contained in a place that we... that we don't have to worry about. And my worry is that, as we see a rise of hate, the rise of anti-Semitism in our country... If you haven't read the ADL report on what is actually going on in our nation around anti-Semitism, I hope that everybody does-- it's sobering. What is happening? We're seeing a rise of all kinds of hate, all kinds of us-versus-them. They're all connected to each other.

00:46:28 So, when I think about what we ought to do when you are talking about the Department of Homeland Security, we took a really long time after 9/11 to begin to say, "Hey, what do we need to do on the ideological front?" And by the way, we haven't done it perfectly, okay, but by the end of the Bush administration, there was a system in place to work on the war of ideas. And by the Obama administration, we're kind of getting into, into place. We didn't scale the way we needed to, okay, but we're moving on this. Today, in America, we're spending less than $3 million on the ideological war, and it isn't only about... It isn't about sort of every kind of ideology, it's... We're not spending the kind of money on neo-Nazi groups...

00:47:09 Gideon Rose: So, programs that were started and were done...
Farah Pandith: Yes.

Gideon Rose: Have been cut because, like, why?

Farah Pandith: So here, as...

Gideon Rose: Why? What's the logic for cutting them?

Farah Pandith: Well, it's a political argument, okay? But, but I would say to you, you know, as we... As we think about how to protect America, I, I get hopeful when I think about certain mayors in our nation who've decided to take it on. They're not waiting for a grand statement from, you know, Washington. They're saying, "What do we want to do here in our own communities?" Look at Mayor Tait in Anaheim, or Mayor Greg Fischer in Louisville, Kentucky. Two amazing mayors, Mayor Tait, who says, "I'm going to be a city of kindness." Mayor Fischer, who says, "I'm going to be a city of compassion."

What does that actually mean? It means that the artwork, in schools, how they feel, what they're doing as mayor, how they unify their communities, they're making a statement about how they want their community to be. That means something to me. I believe that there's far more we can do. We can't just wait for DHS to get more money, to do the kinds of programs and to scale the things that we know work. We can do far more.

Gideon Rose: We were saying before this started that we were trying to model the discourse that professionals have, that's problem-solving rather than, you know, heat-generating.

Farah Pandith: Yes.
Gideon Rose: There's been a debate going on in Congress over some legislation recently. It's politicized stuff on all sides, as much of Congress is these days. But the core intellectual issue is real, and you just raised it, and I want to swing it back. Is hate connected, or is it distinct? Is anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, misogyny, bigotry of all kinds, whatever you'd want, is that... are they all variants of a common, kind of negative... negativity?

Like "Ghostbusters," when the, the... The ghosts underneath the city create bad juju for everybody, and all the bad things get up. And so do all the extremists feed off each other when you put a heat on society and it creates divisions? And in which case, the real answer is to condemn all of the hatred and negativity, and get everybody back on a kind of common ground. Or are there specific loci of hatred, violence, and extremism...

You wrote your entire book not about, "Let's...", "Why can't we all get along?", but about one specific community and subculture, and there are people who say that's what we should focus on. How specific is the problem of extremism and hatred, or is it all just variants of a common problem, and so that we're fighting, we really are fighting all the extremists together, not just, "You don't like these extremists and I don't like those extremists," but, no, we have to recognize they're all extremists?

Farah Pandith: Well, it's a critically important question, right? But as humans, I would hope that all of us would reject hate in any form. And whether it's against somebody because of their race, or their gender, or their sexuality, we should be... we should be humans. We should be kind to each other, obviously. We should respect each other, and I believe, here in America, the most diverse country in the world, we should respect differences. Period. It isn't about anything but how you give dignity to another human being. That's first and foremost.

When you're looking at the research around how people get radicalized, of course, all of these kinds of things build off of each other. And the
system-wide failure has been exactly that question. Well, we can't walk and chew gum at the same time, so therefore we need to pick this kind of hate versus that kind of hate. We need to build coalitions. We need to build coalitions across different groups that are experiencing this kind of stuff. And with regard to who we are as Americans,

00:50:59 I tend to go back to what George Washington said in 1790, when he wrote a letter to the Hebrew congregation, and he said, "In America, to bigotry we give no sanction." And that's who we are as Americans. That's what the ideals we should be holding onto. It isn't about who's the bigger victim and what must we do? It is, who are we as Americans, and what do we stand for?

00:51:21 Gideon Rose: Okay, I love that, and that's a wonderful point. Before we turn to the audience, I want to do one final thing. Again, this is interesting. Those of us who've lived through these debates... In the immediate post-9/11 period, there was this very strong debate about, who is the enemy? What is the specific nature? How do you go after... in various different contexts. And when, a few years later, the more PC types in the administration put forward G-SAVE, or whatever that was, you know, the Global Struggle Against Violent Extremism, and other things like that...

Farah Pandith: (sighs)

Gideon Rose: You remember those years?

Farah Pandith: Oh, yes.

(laughter)

00:51:51 Gideon Rose: Okay, so, there was a whole community of hard-liners who felt that relabeling this fight something like that was a PC way of diverting
attention from the real struggle. And there was another camp that said, "No, this is not just papering it over, this is actually it, because what you think of as the real struggle is one subset of a broader struggle, and we're just literally addressing the core big problem, of which yours is a fully included subset."

00:52:22 I hear you saying strongly the second perspective is correct. And things like, however, even though we couldn't come up with a good acronym, because G-SAVE never caught on because it was really stupid...

(laughter)

Gideon Rose: Just like MOOTWA, Military Operations Other Than War... In the early '90s, we spent a lot of time MOOTWA.

Farah Pandith: This is the best of your government, by the way.

00:52:41 Gideon Rose: MOOTWA never did a thing. "Okay, what are you doing in the Kurd, the Kurdish areas?" "MOOTWA-- military op..." Anyway, G-SAVE, we have to come up with a better acronym, but, but it's a... but your point is, that is the real thing. It's an abstract struggle against hatred and extremism and divisiveness, which manifests itself in lots of competing-- but somehow all allied against us-- intolerant assholes we need to fight.

00:53:05 Farah Pandith: I think-- look, Gideon, what's really important is separating how government talks about these issues and what we do day to day, right? So, regular people need to understand that there are changes that are happening in their communities that bear on each other, which is why these kinds of coalitions need to be built. Different groups that have dealt with these, you know, very difficult challenges around discrimination and bigotry and we can go on and on.
Government has the wrong analysis when it begins to say, "Well, what is that one thing we must do?" Right? We made some serious mistakes in how we defined the problem that we were dealing with. We thought this was a hearts- and-mind kind of thing, right? "If we could just get everybody to love us, as Americans, then we can just show them how great we are."

Gideon Rose: And that didn't work why?

Farah Pandith: Right-- right, right.

Gideon Rose: Why didn't that work?

Farah Pandith: But it went... Can you remember how many years we went on and on?

Gideon Rose: Well, why didn't it work?

Farah Pandith: Because it's the wrong... It is the wrong solution for the problem.

Gideon Rose: Okay-- why?

Farah Pandith: Public diplomacy, that art of persuading someone to buy into what America stands for, is an important thing that our country does for a lot of different reasons. But you cannot apply that toolbox to this problem.

Gideon Rose: Because it's, you're talking at them and it's propaganda, rather than talking with them and changing their minds.
Farah Pandith: Correct, it is not what we are dealing with over here. I think we should be spending a lot of money and a lot of effort and a lot of creativity through our embassies to do far more to talk about who we are as Americans. I'm all for that, I think that's important. But that's not going to be the cure for the thing that I know we can do. If we have learned anything in almost 20 years since this country was attacked on 9/11, it is that what we thought we knew, the way we, you know, we deployed our, our best and brightest hasn't worked. So today...

00:55:03 Gideon Rose: Every time we do that, every 50 years, though, it seems to have worked out really badly.

Farah Pandith: Yeah, yeah, it doesn't work. So, so, my, my hope is that we ask the right questions, and we see the answers that we have in the toolbox that we have, because you know what? The bad guys have that toolbox, and they're using the same tools that we have at our fingertips to do what they're doing. So, why, why would we let that happen?

00:55:26 Gideon Rose: We have a few minutes left. I want to get some questions from our guests here, as well. Please, wait for a microphone. Anybody would like to... yes, over here.

Woman: Thanks, thank you so much for your very interesting talk. It's a very brief question. So a lot of the efforts that you shared and discussed are often covered by the Global Engagement Center. I'd be curious to hear what you would suggest on improving on those efforts, or what is missing. Thanks.

00:56:02 Farah Pandith: So, the Global Engagement Center, for those people who don't know, you were talking about different names, has about seven or eight different versions since it started in the Bush administration.

Gideon Rose: This is a government agency.
Farah Pandith: This is a government agency that has a... has the mandate of pushing back against the kinds of bad things that are being said in the social media space. They are also looking at Russian propaganda, they are also looking at ISIS, they are also looking at the kinds of things that we can do to push back. I take a very strong position in the book about the G.E.C. It is not to be... to be disrespectful of my former colleagues, who have tried very hard, but the idea that America can go out there tweeting our way out of the problem that we're in is not going to work. It's not enough... there's not enough money, there's not enough personnel, the system doesn't work fast enough. There are players outside of government who do that better. My recommendation is that we ask those players to do it and do it right.

Gideon Rose: Yes, over here.

Man: Hi, I'm Andy von Salis. I've worked with a lot of various youth and teen groups, and it seems to me that they don't want to sit around talking about what they should be working on, or why. They want to just do stuff. And I'm envisioning having soccer games between people at the madrassa in Park Slope--where I live, too, when I'm not bragging and say it's really Gowanus...

(laughter)

And, and some other school that's a block and a half away, where the students see each other on the street at the end of the school every day, but don't know anything about one another. Just setting up any activity that would engage them, if the boys want to play soccer, if the girls want to do art, or, you know, whatever it is, they could. And I would think that, from there, maybe let them try to articulate what they might have in common, what they might need in order to form stronger bonds, what might them help understand one another better. They might set up discussion groups or occasions and other things.
So, I'm thinking that while it's great to understand why things are the way they are and what we need to do instead, that's not what the kids want to do-- the kids want to do stuff.

Farah Pandith: The kids are doing... I love that question. Thank you very much for it. Because you're, you're absolutely right. Sitting around having conversations isn't their, their sweet spot. Their sweet spot is to, "Let us show you who we are, let's do stuff." We built programs all over the world in which kids could actually do stuff, and some of them did play soccer matches against each other. Others had, had, open-mike nights, you know. Other did different kinds of things with each other to be able to find ways to, to get to know each other. And I... and I think one of the things that we haven't done enough of is to listen to young people who have these great ideas, the things they want to do, and help them do it. That's something every one of us can do.

Gideon Rose: Okay, let me put some cold water on this, because...

(laughter)

No, you're a serious professional, and I want to do you the honor of having the kind of... We talked before about having the conversations we have inside the system, which is very straight, serious, honest questions. Not like the politicized BS talk radio we hear in public discourse. The professionals talk among each other, they're not posturing.

So, here's the thing, everything you just said makes total sense. And I thought it made total sense a generation ago, when we did it with Seeds of Peace, which was, of all the various organizations I've ever been connected of, the one that most seemed the logical, obvious thing: get Israeli and Palestinian children together, send them to a wonderful camp up in Maine-- my old camp, Camp Powhatan, now closed down-- and have them do all the kinds of things, not just teams for Palestinian and Israeli kids, but... You know, teams across, and then have, you know, Jacques d'Amboise and the National Dance Institute come and teach them mobility and motion, and the Palestinian dancers and the Jewish
dancers all get together, and then, and you know what? As far as I can tell, even though the wonderful efforts of Seeds of Peace have been a great thing, I don't think there has been any actual measurable impact.

And the peace process certainly ain't any better now than it was 25 years ago, and I see no effort that that kind of stuff works at having a durable, scalable intervention that gets those people to act differently when they're back in the home context, and, you know, after the, the... the intercommunal softball league game is over, and they go back to them blowing each other up, and, and stealing the field.

Farah Pandith: So, let me push back on you. One of the things that is problematic is the idea of a one-off Organization that's going to fix the world. And I will sit here and talk to you... I can... we can talk about Seeds of Peace, which is an amazing organization, by the way. And you know that, too.

Gideon Rose: I love it.

Farah Pandith: No, no, no, right-- and I just want to be clear that you're not criticizing Seeds of Peace. But also, because individuals within organizations actually are transformed in some of these ways. Here's what's missing, though. The scale of all of these things, there are not enough of them, right? On an individual level, what we haven't seen is the kind of momentum by NGOs that are doing the kind of work that I've been describing. They're only hitting a very small sector, and it's, it's ad hoc-- it's not coordinated.

What I argue is, that will never get... you're correct. We'll never be able to see any changes, anywhere, if that's all-- it's like a Whac-A-Mole kind of situation. But what happens if you actually go all in? What happens if you decide, for the next five years, in this particular town, all day, every day, we're going, we are going to use all of the NGOs, all of the libraries, all of the schools, all the parents are going... we're going to do this, we're going to do it big, we're going to go all in for five years, then measure.
Then tell me what we're doing. You cannot measure the way we have the world today. Because it can't just be that little thing that's happening in Ontario, and that little thing that's happening in Palm Beach. It has to be a coordinated effort by... That's why I talk about the mayors. Because I think that cities can do something, I think that libraries and school and parents can do things. And PTAs can do things.

I am not Pollyanna, okay? And if I were sitting at a policy table with you at the E.E.O.B., and we were having this conversation about where we're going to do things and what paper we're going to recommend to the president, these are the kinds of questions obviously we would ask. "Are you kidding me? That little thing is going to do something?" No, we'd have to show, how many of them are we doing? How often are we doing them? And what are we... what is the return on that investment? I believe that we haven't even tried, we have no way of even measuring, because there has been nowhere in the world that's done it all day, every day, on this issue.

But they've done it on other issues. They've done it on recycling; they've done it on awareness with health; they've done it in other ways where we can measure what happens when everybody... "We're going to have a, a recycling town and this is what we are going to do." And, oh, wow, in five years, they went from doing this to doing that.

What happened? There was a system-wide experiment that actually changed. In my book, I talk about an example in Iceland, and I'm not going to give it away. But it's exactly to that point, because, obviously, we're not living in la-la land over here. And we're not wishing, you know, as many unicorns and rainbows exist in this world. Although, I would like that, that would be nice. We're talking about real deal, you know, and, and I think it's fair to ask that question. "What are you talking about? One NGO doing every..." That's totally fair. But it's not fair to measure this idea of peace, or less hate, if we've never even tried.
Gideon Rose: So, I think that's a wonderful answer, and I think that the analogy that pops to mind is public health. What I hear you saying is, you know, public health is a long-term, coordinated, integrated project. You're not going to go after one specific disease or if not, one specific program. You have to build good local public health systems in countries, and that's going to... more important than the specific one-off aid of, "Here's that medicine."

And it almost... extremism is almost like a kind of public mental health issue. And so, in the same ways, what's going to stop it, or control it, or keep it back, is not the one-off thing, but building stronger immunity systems and long-term interventions, comprehensively coordinated across all the measures of things, in the same way you would do a public health model, rather than a sort of...

Farah Pandith: Exactly.

Gideon Rose: And, in fact, think of it more like public mental health, than, than a kinetic military threat.

Farah Pandith: Absolutely.

Gideon Rose: Okay, Farah, this is wonderful. Let me just say two things. One is, this is a taste of how serious professionals talk about issues. In the U.S., we have a sort of somewhat penetrated political system. Unlike other countries, which run foreign policy by diplomatic professionals, like, you know, "Yes, Minister," and Sir Humphrey runs everything, and... Or, in the... Or just have amateurs come and run it.

In the U.S., we have a whole... the several top layers are people who go in and out, and in and out. And that can be bad when it becomes politicized-- hacks who come in and don't know anything. Or campaign contribution ambassadors who just basically get patronage things.
But the upside potential of that interpenetrated system is, you can have people who are not just government officials and technocrats, but who spend time outside doing research. They spend time in this industry, or in that area, and they can bring an infusion of new ideas and new approaches to how government works. And the best of them, like Farah, can bring an appreciation of what government can do, what it can't do, and how you should mix these things. And that's genius, and that's the... what these kinds of conversations should be like.

Secondly, a last thing I want to highlight in this is the connection to social science. You said you are not a social scientist, but what you just called for was more social science, and a wonderful partnership between not just the government and the NGOs, but the government and the NGOs and the social science community, which is just now starting to apply real-world techniques of project management and assessment to actually tell what the interventions do. The randomized trials, the things we are actually seeing in the aid world...

Farah Pandith: Yes.

Gideon Rose: ...is revolutionary compared to what we thought of a generation ago for how you evaluated programs. It's similar to the kind of scientific and social scientific approach we use in public health, and I think that if we can bring rational social science, the best, dispassionate, calm stuff, to these kind of areas in evaluating what the interventions are, and almost use public health models, we will be on track to a progressive and cumulative strategy that works better over time as we incorporate the results from real scientific tests, rather than just trying something, and having it work or not, and coming in, and a new set of people try it.

The key thing is to build research in and reflectivity in so that our programs go better over time, not worse.

Farah Pandith: 100%.
Gideon Rose: Farah, thank you for this.

Farah Pandith: Thank you.

Gideon Rose: Thank all of you for coming, and hopefully, we'll do better in the next generation on this challenge than we have done on the last generation. And if we can be mindful, and avoid... introducing space between stimulus and response and thinking of national policy as a considered response rather than a knee-jerk reaction to stimulus. If we can do that, and then fill that space with wise, empathic policies, we might have an answer.

And we have one quick, final comment over here from this woman.

Woman (off mic): A few years ago, I attended the 70th commemoration of the... 

Gideon Rose: Hold on one second and wait for the microphone, so everybody can hear you.

Woman: A few years ago, I attended the 70th commemoration of the liberation of Auschwitz, and there is a phenomenal gentleman called Roman Kent, you can Google him, and he was a survivor of Auschwitz. He lives here in New York, and he's spoken at the U.N., et cetera. And he said, if he could have an 11th commandment, it would be, "Thou shalt not be a bystander." So I think that we all need to remember, each and every single one of us can do our little bit and see other people as human beings and help. Do whatever it is that you can do, because a movement starts not only from up here in government policies, from the grassroots level. And that's how so many people did survive the Holocaust, because maybe a simple person helped them. Not the government. So, think of Roman Kent, okay?
Gideon Rose: I will think of Roman Kent, and Viktor Frankl, who I quoted in the beginning. Was himself a survivor, and found in a life dedicated to meaning something that kept him alive when everything around was disaster. That doesn't mean that... you know, he needed luck, too. But the people who had luck and a sense of purpose survived and had healthy, happy lives.

The people who didn't have luck died. But the people who had... you know, didn't have a good mental attitude... So we can make things better.

Farah Pandith: Yes.

Gideon Rose: And you're half-full rather than half-empty.

Farah Pandith: I know that there are solutions, and they're affordable, and they are available, and it takes all of us.

Gideon Rose: To quote...

Farah Pandith: Thank you for being here, I really appreciate it.

(applause)