Prosecuting the 1993 Bombers (2/22/18)

00:00:29 Alice Greenwald: I'm Alice Greenwald, president and C.E.O. of the 9/11 Memorial & Museum, and it is my great pleasure to welcome all of you to tonight's program, along with those who are tuning in live on our web broadcast at 911memorial.org/live. As always, we are delighted to see our museum members in the audience.

And I also want to recognize and welcome U.S. Attorney Geoffrey Berman and Deputy U.S. Attorney Robert Khuzami of the Southern District of New York, and along with them, Gil Childers, who was the lead prosecutor for the 1993... the first 1993 trial of the bombers.

00:01:11 And we're just delighted to see all of you here as we approach, four days from now, the observance of the 25th anniversary of the first terrorist attack at the World Trade Center. As most of you know, on February 26, 1993, at 12:18 p.m., terrorists detonated a bomb in the parking garage beneath the North Tower of the World Trade Center. The explosion killed six and injured more than a thousand. Tens of thousands of panicked and terrified people inside the buildings evacuated down completely dark and smoke-filled stairways.

00:01:53 Others waited on tower rooftops for NYPD Emergency Service Unit personnel to perform helicopter rescues. And due to a power failure that was caused by the bomb blast, some people were trapped in elevators for hours. The last survivors would escape to safety more than 11 hours after the bomb went off. The attack on that snowy afternoon triggered the largest emergency mobilization of first responders in New York City history, a record that held for another eight years, until September 11, 2001.
While overshadowed by 9/11, the 1993 bombing represented a pivotal moment in the history of the World Trade Center, the city of New York, and frankly, our own national reckoning with terrorism in a global age. It was also a landmark moment for law enforcement and the justice system. The first of the perpetrators was arrested within a week of the attack, and by October of that same year, four of the co-conspirators were brought to trial in federal court in Lower Manhattan.

Tonight we are joined by Mary Jo White, former U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, who oversaw the prosecution of the apprehended terrorists. Mary Jo White was the first woman appointed to hold this office and served from 1993 to 2002. During her tenure, she specialized in international terrorism cases, securing convictions for the perpetrators of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and creating a terrorism investigation unit within the Southern District.

In addition, Mary Jo White's impressive record of prosecuting white-collar crimes in the Southern District led to her 2013 appointment by President Barack Obama as chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission. White stepped down from the S.E.C. in January 2017 and is currently a litigation partner and senior chair at Debevoise & Plimpton law firm, which she's told me she's returned to six times.

We are so privileged to have Mary Jo with us this evening, and I want to thank her for sharing her time and her insights with us. We are also deeply grateful to the David Berg Foundation for supporting the museum's current public program season. So, without further ado, please join me in welcoming Mary Jo White in conversation with the museum's executive vice president and deputy director for museum programs, Cliff Chanin.

(applause)
Clifford Chanin: Thank you so much, Alice. So, welcome, everybody—welcome.

Mary Jo White: Thank you.

Clifford Chanin: It really is, as Alice said, Monday, 25 years. And you were, at that point, when the bomb went off in the World Trade Center, you were the acting U.S. attorney in the Eastern District, and you would be on your way here to the Southern District very soon thereafter. But I wonder if you could tell about your first impression when you heard the news, and what you thought this might be, as opposed to what it turned out to be.

Mary Jo White: Yeah, I think—and I was in the Eastern District then— I was on my way to lunch and sort of, with some colleagues from the Eastern District and heard that there... They thought there had been a bombing there. I think two weeks later, I was nominated to be the Southern District U.S. attorney.

And so on March 1—this is less than two weeks—I got a call from Janet Reno, the attorney general. I'm sitting in Brooklyn, and she asked if I was satisfied with the way the investigation of the Trade Center bombing was being handled, and I said, "It's actually not my case 'cause I'm in the Eastern District." But really from that day forward, you know, I was kind of in charge of overseeing it. What did we think it was? I think initially, um... you know, I mean, I think as critics say, as well, you know, thought it to be, you know, however motivated, perhaps an isolated criminal act. I was not of that view for very long, though.

Clifford Chanin: What was it that changed your view about that?

Mary Jo White: It really was the continuing investigation of it. I mean, every single day learning more and more about the network while still in the Eastern District. I didn't actually come physically to the Southern
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District until June of 1993, I think. Gil Childers, who's here, and Henry DePippo, who were the lead prosecutors in the first Trade Center bombing, came to my office in Brooklyn and informed me about another plot going on.

Same time, a week or so after the Trade Center bombing, when I learned about it-- the Day of Terror plot, which was headed by the Blind Sheikh. Essentially, that was the plot to blow up the bridges and tunnels connecting New York and New Jersey. And so that was investigated, prosecuted, and a combination of the... those two cases and what we learned during the investigation-- didn't fully understand it. I mean, one of the things people didn't appreciate, I think, is, you can convict people on sufficient evidence without knowing the full story. And so, certainly from my point of view, I just saw red lights blinking everywhere about how serious I thought this threat was from international terrorists, you know, Islamic fundamentalists, how long-term I thought it was, and how little we knew about it, but how dangerous it was.

And so once we'd actually finished the Trade Center trial-- the four defendants on trial were convicted-- finished the Trade Center trial, finished the Day of Terror trial, where about nine others were convicted, I did form the first terrorism unit in any U.S. attorney's office prior to 9/11 because I wanted not to ever do another terrorism case, if I could avoid it-- did not want there to be another terrorism case-- but so that we could follow all the leads that we, you know, had from the evidence we gathered there.

Clifford Chanin: Come back a little bit in time. As it's dawning on you that this threat is more than initially it appeared to be, how are you taking this information to the government at large? I mean, who were you talking to? How were they reacting to your sense that, "Wait a minute, this is much bigger than this one event, as bad as that was"?

Mary Jo White: I think it varied, how people were taking it. How did... Who did we communicate with? Clearly the FBI. I personally communicated with Janet Reno, the attorney general, Louis Freeh, the
director of the FBI, who I'd known for many years. And then, you know, it was in various conversations, you know, over time.

00:08:48 I mean, I think different people, particularly early on, had very different views of how dangerous or not it was. I remember during the Day of Terror case, the Blind Sheikh, who we ultimately indicted in that case-- a number of people in the government didn't want to indict him, but rather to deport him. And my view was, the worst thing you possibly could do when you have this long-term risk to the security of the United States is to deport someone and lose track of them.

Clifford Chanin: Mm-hmm.

Mary Jo White: So, it took a while, I think, for most of our government to appreciate how dangerous the risk was.

00:09:27 Clifford Chanin: In terms of the prosecution of the '93 bombing, there were two trials, because two of the ultimate defendants were not caught in that first sweep that got four. But as you were preparing the prosecution-- Gil and Henry and the others-- I mean, did it seem like this was going to be clear and simple in terms of the prosecution, or were there particular hurdles that you anticipated either because this was kind of a new kind of case that the jury might not understand, or for national security reasons?

00:09:58 Mary Jo White: Well, the national security issues in all these cases-- and eventually I think we did 36 terrorist defendants-- I mean, and you always ran into situations where you might not be able to use certain evidence in a case because of national security concerns. And that meant you were trying the case on less evidence than you would other kinds of cases.

The first Trade Center bombing trial, brilliantly tried by Gil and Henry and Mike Garcia and Lev Dassin, was really-- Yousef wasn't there, who was the mastermind of the Trade Center bombing. Most of the evidence we
had, in a sense, as I recall it, was about Yousef, so you in effect tried him in absentia and then connected the other defendants to him.

It was, you know, purely a circumstantial evidence case. You didn't have an insider, you had no confession. You had phone records and fingerprints, and it was, you know, it was pieced together quite, you know, powerfully. And I'm not sure, you know, all the jurors really understood it until the summation sort of, you know, knitted it all together, you know, for them.

But it was really a very difficult case. The model that you have, you know, downstairs, you know, it was a very important piece of that to sort of make the bombing come alive. As I recall, three of the four defendants--typical lawyering, perhaps not good lawyering--you know, claimed there hadn't been a bombing. "And if there was a bombing, my guy didn't do it," you know, kind of thing.

And so, you know, to actually have the... really the scene of devastation, you know, come alive with the model was really very important. Obviously, six people and the unborn son of Monica Smith, the sixth victim, you know, died tragically in that bombing, as well. But it was a tough, it was a tough case.

Clifford Chanin: How do you, as U.S. attorney, follow the ongoing development of strategy? And what happens inside the office during a case like this?

Mary Jo White: They will really give me up for this. Rob Khuzami's out there, too, from the Day of Terror trial. I followed it rather closely.

(laughter)

Mary Jo White You know, I was in the courtroom a lot.
Clifford Chanin: Uh-huh.

Mary Jo White: I was meeting with folks a lot, probably, probably more so in the Day of Terror trial. You know, I didn't physically get over to the Southern District until June of 1993, even though I was bothering them before that. You know, I would catch up with the transcripts, I mean, you know, and offer thoughts. I mean, you know, the folks that did these terrorism cases in the Southern District were just, you know, spectacular prosecutors. They didn't really need my help, but they got it anyway.

(laughter)

Clifford Chanin: And so the first trial ends with the conviction of the four defendants-- very lengthy sentences by Judge Duffy. At that point, though, you already have the second case underway. Is that not the chronology?

Mary Jo White: That is the chronology.

Clifford Chanin: And so, how did you see these two cases? How did you see these two cases? Were they both sort of the emanations of one group of people who were convinced that these were the kinds of things that ought to be done, or were they sort of discrete acts with a couple of links between them?

Mary Jo White: I think there were links. The sheikh was clearly a link. But we learned more and more about the links as time went on.

Clifford Chanin: Mm-hmm.
Mary Jo White: Some pieces, you know, remained in isolation for longer than others. You know, we first learned a little bit about bin Laden in... probably 1995, no idea who he really was, eventually learned more. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, also, the mastermind of 9/11, kind of came into the picture over the years.

Clifford Chanin: Mm-hmm. (coughs) You write...

Mary Jo White: Yes... I had my granddaughters, you know.

Clifford Chanin: We have a very helpful audience. (laughs): Thank you.

Mary Jo White: Keep talking...

Clifford Chanin: Yeah, this was my, this was my cue. I'm sorry I missed it. The number of cases, as you alluded to before, many defendants and a number of really critically important cases over the course of time, and what's interesting-- you wrote in the first quarter of 2001-- spring 2001-- this article in the "Middle East Quarterly," "Prosecuting Terrorism in New York," which, you know, up to that point, is the state of the art of these cases of increasing international reach, increasing complexity.

So as you're prosecuting them-- and you might take us along through the list of these cases-- are you really beginning to become more convinced that the threat is even greater than the last case revealed it to be?

Mary Jo White: Without question, I think. I mean, you know, the Day of Terror trial really was a... it was a declaration of war. You know, urban terrorism war against the United States. (coughs): And everything we learned made us more fearful of the risk.

Clifford Chanin: And what does that do to the investigators..
Mary Jo White: Pardon me.

00:14:59 Clifford Chanin: ...and the prosecutors who are sort of watching this? And you have to be thinking, "What don't I know about what's going on out there?"

Mary Jo White: Well, and you still don't know.

Clifford Chanin: Yeah.

Mary Jo White: You still don't know everything, I think. I mean, you learn as much as you can as fast as you can. You alert people to the dangers that you see. You piece together what you can. You neutralize with criminal cases, if they're available, dangerous terrorists, but you keep investigating.

00:15:26 Clifford Chanin: One of the interesting things-- it comes to the Day of Terror case, otherwise known as the landmarks plot. Because we spoke about this earlier, and that particular investigation and prosecution really became almost a model, but it also set an example of what critics would latch onto, as a kind of entrapment argument, because you did have an informant in the middle of this plot.

You had the informant sort of feeding them, sort of further steps into the plot, and yet, this was a group that was clearly determined to do very, very great damage. So, you know, that was a very successful example of something that prevented a case.

00:16:07 Mary Jo White: Well, and look, this was one of the biggest challenges I had when I first became U.S. attorney. It would have been a challenge no matter when I had it, but I had just become U.S. attorney. And in that case, we had an informant known as the Million Dollar Man. Paid a lot of
money to be the informant, a lot of impeachment. (coughs): And we had the warehouse in which the co-conspirators were mixing-- really building- - the bombs under surveillance.

00:16:35

And so one of the decisions we had to make was, when do you take the case down? When do you actually... (coughs): Pardon me-- arrest the defendants? And you never want to compromise, you know, public safety when you're making those decisions. And so that really kind of fell to me to decide. And then you want to bring in, you know, you want your net as broadly-- to be as broad as it can be to bring in even, you know, more dangerous terrorists into the loop-- more senior people. And so, you know, yes, there were entrapment arguments made.

I mean, we successfully rebutted those arguments. And you, you always will err on the side of public safety, even if you lose a couple of people from your, you know, your criminal prosecution.

00:17:19

Clifford Chanin: The issue of informants and entrapment has continued to be a theme...

Mary Jo White: Yep.

Clifford Chanin: ...in the assessment of these cases-- and not just cases in the Southern District-- and I wonder if you could step back and think about, you know, this on the grander scale. I mean, is there a risk of government being too aggressive in some of these cases?

00:17:39

Mary Jo White: There can be. I mean, I think you have to-- you know, I mean, I think you-- it's... There's a lot of judgment involved. I mean, I think the... (coughs): Once the law was amended to provide for prosecutions for lending material support to terrorism-- and that was really after 9/11 when that really, you know, occurred-- you have to be careful that you're not, you know, kind of planting the idea and fomenting the idea. (coughs) But I also think you have to be
extraordinarily aggressive in these prosecutions. You know, and not just prosecute the leaders, but also prosecute those that, you know, rent the cars...

Clifford Chanin: Mm-hmm.

00:18:18 Mary Jo White: ...provide the ingredients, and so forth. So it's a, it's a--you know, it's something you need, people with judgment and discretion to decide how best to do it. But you have to use informants.

Clifford Chanin: One of the...

Mary Jo White: If you, if you have the ability to have an informant.

Clifford Chanin: Right, right. One of the things that you mention in this article is the development of the JTTF, and the importance that it played. It expanded, I believe, too, because of the '93 investigation, new agencies were brought into that, and then became members of the JTTF. But explain to us, if you will, why that was so significant and the role that it plays.

00:18:54 Mary Jo White: Well, the JTTF actually goes back to the F.A.L.N. bombings, back in, you know, the '80s. And it's basically, the concept of the JTTF is, you need inter-agency cooperation in order to successfully, you know, ferret out terrorism, as well as to prosecute it. NYPD and FBI kind of being the lead agencies in that. And it's so obvious that that is so.

00:19:19 I mean, after 9/11, you know, you also, I think the world began to realize that needs to be a global, you know, JTTF, in effect. One of the things that Louis Freeh did as director of the FBI, before 9/11, was to establish liaison offices, you know, around the world. And that's what made possible stopping a lot of plots, prosecuting a lot of defendants. And so the JTTF,
in my mind, you know, lots of plots were foiled by the JTTF before 1993, before 9/11, and after 9/11.

And, you know, I still call it, as I think I did before 9/11 in that article you were referencing, one of the heroes of the city. And there's some members here tonight from the current JTTF. And, you know, we owe them an awful lot.

Clifford Chanin: Yep, yep. Is that-- you talk about the model-- but it was not necessarily the easiest thing to get underway. We had an earlier program here about those first early days of the initial creation of the JTTF. And then, you know, the FBI-NYPD relationship not always the smoothest, and then, you know, what is the issue of adding these agencies and making sure that they continue to cooperate? How does that happen?

Mary Jo White: Well, you know, it's people-driven, you know, both at the leadership, you know, level, but also, really, at the line level, I think. I mean, if you share the... You know, just stepping back for a second, talking about these cases in the U.S. attorney's office, you could not be more committed to the mission than those cases. I mean, all, all the cases that you handle as a prosecutor are important to you, but these are really national security kinds of cases. Security of the city is at stake.

And when you get agents from different agencies who work with each other in the trenches, who share that commitment, the cooperation flows. You sometimes want to keep the leaders out of it. You know, they can mess it up, basically. And look, there have been some-- you know, there's no question that there have been, you know, after 9/11, particularly, I think-- some might say before-- you know, some tussles between NYPD and, you know, the FBI, for example, but by and large, you know, the combination of those two lead agencies and all the other agencies, the Port Authority included, you know, have brought about things and prevented plots that would not have, you know, not have been prevented had you not had that level of cooperation. But you have to keep working at it.
Clifford Chanin: As you think about the cases that you prosecuted over the tenure in the Southern District, how did the legal strategies evolve? Did they become more sophisticated? Did they put new tools in play? Or were you, through this period, working, essentially, with the same toolbox?

Mary Jo White: Well, every case was different. I mean, I think I mentioned the first Trade Center trial, which was really circumstantial evidence alone. You had an informant in the second trial. The Manila air plot, which was one of the other cases where Yousef was a major player, which was basically a plot to, you know, blow up, literally, 12 jumbo jets coming back-- U.S. carriers-- coming back from the Far East to, you know, various U.S. citizens.

He actually-- on the plane back from Pakistan, when he was apprehended-- you know, actually talked about that, so you had some pieces of a confession to use in both the Trade Center trial and the Manila air trial. One of the most frightening things about what he didn't say, though, was one thing he wouldn't say, as he was bragging about what he did in the Trade Center bombing in '93, and what he did in Manila air, was just how he smuggled, you know, through security, the ingredients to basically blow up those planes.

Because, he said, I've got people, you know, around the world to, who, who know that technology, and I don't want, you know, I'm not gonna let you guys know about that. Another-- you know, there was a computer that had a lot of evidence on...

Clifford Chanin: We have it downstairs in the museum.

Mary Jo White: Yeah, yes, the Bojinka plot. And I confirmed with Mary Galligan, who's here tonight, that there are still portions of that computer of Yousef's that were encrypted-- we didn't have that evidence at the
trial because no one could crack the code— that still haven't been cracked. So... so, yeah, so that, that case was different.

00:23:29 In East Africa embassies—let me see, that occurred in 1998, 224 people losing their lives, innocent people at our embassies, most of the evidence there, you know, came from abroad, as it would. We also had confessions from two of the defendants that our assistants obtained when I sent them over to Tanzania and to Kenya to get those.

00:23:53 So every one was really different. I think what changed the most-- and every case is different, whether it's terrorism or, you know, you have evidence, sometimes you have confessions, sometimes you don't. Sometimes you have fingerprints, sometimes you don't. What differed most over time, I think, was the greater degree of cooperation we got from the intelligence community.

00:24:11 When we first started— understandably, actually— no real relationship had had to be built then, between law enforcement and the intelligence agencies, in terms of using evidence in cases involving international terrorism that had a national security component. And so, naturally, on the intelligence side, particularly, you were concerned that that was gonna be compromised. You know, sources and methods, and, you know, and others that were out there that might prevent the next attack might have to be turned over in a criminal trial. And that's, obviously, of grave, grave concern.

00:24:47 Over time-- and we knew, by the way, in every one of these cases—I think there were six in all... (clears throat): ...while I was there-- that we might have to pull the plug. Because we would run into something in the case that required us, under the federal rules of discovery, to provide evidence to the defense that, you know, was just too important, from a national security point of view, to provide it. And so we would have to let that terrorist go out the door. (coughs): Talk about pressure, right?

00:25:16 We were able to get, fortunately, protective orders from the judges that allowed us to satisfy the rules, be fair about it, and not run into that
barrier where we had to pull the plug. But over time, the intelligence community understood we were gonna protect national security. And so they were more forthcoming, I think, is my impression, with what was made available to us to at least consider using as evidence.

00:25:42 You know, one of the things that, when I was U.S. attorney, I probably spent, I would say, 60% of my personal time on terrorism. I mean, not expecting to ever do that in the white-collar district of the Southern District of New York. And I work, you know, all but four hours a day, so that's a lot of time. But I would get calls, you know, in the middle of the night, from Gil or Henry or Rob, and saying, well, the British have somebody-- I'm making up British, but it was the British, sometimes-- who had detained someone who was connected to one of our investigations or cases, and asking can we take him. Can we take him in as a defendant in one of our cases and prosecute him in a U.S. courtroom? Because they were going to have to let him go. They didn't have enough.

00:26:23 And so, I always had two questions. One was, "What evidence do you have?" Good question, right? Second question, "What evidence can I use?" Two very different questions in these cases because there was always a chunk of evidence you just could not use because of how much more important it was on the national security side.

00:26:42 Clifford Chanin: So your increasing cooperation and trust from the intelligence community was sort of the mirror of the JTTF on the law enforcement side. They're beginning to see that this is a whole... of government prosecution, essentially, where, as an international event, they need to be part of it even if they're giving you some of their crown jewels.

00:27:03 Mary Jo White: Yeah, no, I think that's right. And, you know, and again, there was an awful lot of evidence that I would have loved to have used. It's a... I mean, it's interesting. We ended up, in all, I think there were... I think there were, there were 30-some defendants in all that we indicted and convicted, and there weren't-- and I don't say this in a boastful way-- there weren't any acquittals. And so, I think the world at large thought
these cases were really easy to do, whereas they were excruciatingly
difficult to do. I mean, there was a lot of behind-the-scenes stuff that
nobody ever knew about.

00:27:34 Clifford Chanin: What's the nature of that stuff? I don't know if you can
give the details, but what is the nature of the problem?

Mary Jo White: Well, it's really what I was saying. I mean... how thin some
of the cases were, the evidence. You know, there was enough, you know,
to go forward, but thin. There was evidence we couldn't use that would
have been, would have made it a very strong case, whereas I had a pretty
weak case, instead.

00:27:55 Clifford Chanin: Take us back to after the... the first four are arrested in
the '93 bombing. Yousef is still at large. What's your sense of him and the
threat that he poses at that point as a result of the '93 bombing?

Mary Jo White: I mean, I thought-- and again, we learned more over
time-- I thought he was an extreme threat. And again, it's that threat
from abroad that you don't know where he is. You don't know when he's
gonna strike next. And the next, at least I hear of him, is from the
Philippines, you know, where, fortunately, there was a fire in the
apartment in Manila where, you know, bombs were being mixed and
made, basically.

00:28:35 Unfortunately, in the Manila air plot I mentioned before, he actually did a
test run, where, you know, he basically... A Japanese citizen on a flight
was killed in that test run. I mentioned before what he wouldn't tell the
agents coming back from Pakistan-- "There are others of my colleagues
out there..." You know, that are basically... "They know how to, you
know, smuggle these ingredients, you know, through security," to have
the next Manila air plot occur.
And of course, you've had more recently, very similar plots foiled in London and so forth. You know, and I think one of the most... you know, "head-jerking" I guess is the phrase I would use, experiences that I ever had was watching Yousef... When he came back in, I guess it was '95?

Clifford Chanin: Mm-hmm.

Mary Jo White: He was tried first for the Manila air plot. And he announces, I think on the day of the openings, or close to that, that he wants to represent himself, you know, pro se, which is, under our Constitution, basically permitted after the judge warns you how not smart that may be. And, you know, you could see the jury, you know, just sort of physically recoil when they realized that, you know, this lead terrorist, defendant, at least accused, was going to be standing three feet away from them trying this case.

And he was... I mean, keep in mind, English is not his first language. He's not a lawyer by training. And without insulting, overly, the other lawyers in the case, you know, I think he was the best lawyer in the case. I mean, you know, he was brilliant. He was absolutely brilliant. So I always thought he was one of the most... You know, some people have, you know, over time, I think have minimized how major a player he was. You know, I don't sort of get into ranking how major the players are. I get into ranking how dangerous I thought they were. And I thought he was one of the most dangerous people on the planet.

Clifford Chanin: Did you have any occasion to interview him, or be present for those interviews as U.S. attorney, or was that left to the, either the FBI or anybody else?

Mary Jo White: No, and he wasn't, he really wasn't, you know, allowing himself to be interviewed, except back on the plane from Pakistan that I mentioned. I was, however, in the FBI command center when he was brought back from Pakistan.
00:30:48 I mean, one of the... someone, you know, has asked, you know, "How did these cases sort of end up in New York?" The ones that, you know, certainly involved the Manila air plot, for example. And it's really... It's either in Washington, DC, that there's venue under our laws, or it's in the district where that defendant is first found. And so, I was sort of monitoring his being flown back from Pakistan in bad weather to Stewart Airport in the northern reaches of the Southern District of New York, which, someone wanted to land him at Kennedy.

00:31:17 And I said, "You can't land him at Kennedy because I won't have venue over him if you land him at Kennedy." And so... But, you know, I saw him come off the elevator when he was brought into the command... you know, the FBI command center. There was no exchange of... But I wanted to be there.

Clifford Chanin: Mm-hmm.

Mary Jo White: I wanted to be there. I wanted to see that he was safely in custody.

00:31:40 Clifford Chanin: How do you account for his views? I mean, how do you weigh the factors of religion, politics, personal hatred, however it matches up in your mind?

Mary Jo White: You know, some of that I don't profess to understand, even now. I mean, clearly we were regarded-- "we" meaning the United States-- you know, as the great Satan. Combination of reasons for that. Mostly the bottom line, I would say, is if you don't follow the beliefs of the terrorists... And again, I think they, you know, obviously, defiled, you know, the very honorable religion of, you know, Islam by, you know, their own beliefs.

00:32:17 But we represented everything they hated, basically. And so we were the great Satan. So, and, you know, so there... There basically was no, you
know, compunction about killing women and children in order to, you know, topple our government, which was literally, you know, the objective.

Clifford Chanin: In relation to the Manila plot, for the planes, his partner in crime, literally, was Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who would, of course, come back at 9/11. Was, was KSM on your radar at that point as an important figure to be found, as a result of these earlier cases and the investigations?

Mary Jo White: He... Again, my recollection, he came into our radar screen much like bin Laden did, very slowly. We knew, I believe, at the time we did the Manila air trial, that he had provided some of the money for it. Later-- and he was indicted for it under seal. Eventually unsealed. And, you know, he, he really was probably the mastermind of Manila air, as well as, everyone says, and I have no reason to doubt it, of 9/11, or certainly one of the masterminds.

One of the tragedies of... You know, there are many of them, frankly, in some ways, I mean, obviously, bin Laden was not, you know, captured in response. We indicted him twice, including for the East Africa embassy bombings, but we were, you know, the FBI was extraordinarily close to getting Khalid Sheikh Mohammed into custody, in, you know, I forget the year, whether it was '97 or '98, in Qatar, and he basically-- however he managed it-- escaped, you know, within a half an hour of when he would've been on the plane back to the United States. You know, that, that can't tell you, necessarily, that 9/11 wouldn't have happened, but it's...

One of my other views on this is that disruption is huge. You know, when you disrupt something, whether you're an intelligence agency or you grab a leader and put them on trial in a civilian criminal court, the plot may not happen or it may not happen yet, and it can give law enforcement a chance to catch up and maybe prevent that plot, so that was a big tragedy.
Clifford Chanin: You mentioned the indictments, too, out of the Southern District, of Osama bin Laden. How did those indictments relate to these other cases, and what you had learned from those prosecutions and investigations?

Mary Jo White: The first indictment against bin Laden was essentially a conspiracy to attack American defense facilities abroad. And we had that information from someone who ultimately became a cooperator, al-Fadl, in the East Africa embassy bombing trials, and then he was indicted again shortly thereafter in '98 for the East Africa embassy bombings.

You know, I think, and, and sort of, you know, you hear this from others, as well, as soon as East Africa happened, we knew enough about bin Laden then-- and keep in mind, Tanzania and Kenya, they're... The bombings were very close together, showed a kind of sophistication that you hadn't seen before, and those of us involved in, in this matter, including in Washington, as well as New York, you instantaneously—we could've been wrong-- but basically said "It's bin Laden, it's bin Laden."

And if you look at the East Africa embassy indictment, and there are about, you know, a dozen to 14 defendants there, six, ultimately, maybe seven, ultimately, you know, tried and convicted, the entire al-Qaeda leadership is laid out in that indictment. And so, by then we knew a lot more, clearly, than we knew in 1993. I mean, by, you know, a huge, you know, margin. One, you know, again, one of the... somewhat-- I guess I would call it an irony, to some degree, a little disturbing irony, to a greater degree perhaps, but after 9/11, my understanding is that the military initially used our al-Qaeda indictment to find, to decide who to go after, to try to apprehend, once we were in Afghanistan. So that showed you how much we knew, or perhaps how much we didn't know, you know, as a government at large, but...

Clifford Chanin: It also speaks to the integration of the law enforcement efforts here, and what would become, of course, this, this global effort in the years ahead. Were you, in the Southern District, an active part of the
more international investigations or considerations of what was going on? Or was it simply that—not "simply"—but was it that you were concentrating on your cases which generated this information that was then fed into the system, but did you sort of, in terms of your sense of what was going on, extend out of the Southern District into this global issue?

Mary Jo White: Well, of necessity, I think we extended outward because of the nature of the cases and the players that were in it, the nature of the threat, but no, I mean, I have to say, I've learned a lot since 9/11, from the 9/11 Commission and otherwise; my impression was: we were clearly trying to share any information that we had with other parts of, of the government, and that's why I formed the unit, frankly, but we were just a small, you know, sort of tool in the arsenal, in terms of this, you know, larger, very serious threat from Islamic fundamentalist terrorists, terrorists around the world. The military were doing things, the intelligence community were, were doing things that we really were not privy to.

Clifford Chanin: Right.

Mary Jo White: Since 9/11, and some of the findings suggest to me that less was going on than I thought was going on elsewhere. I remember testifying before the-- after 9/11-- before the joint House/Senate intelligence committee, and one of the congressmen asking me, "Didn't you need help?" And I, I said, "With the cases? You know, I mean, I could use any help I can get, obviously, but, but no is the answer to that," and basically, his point was, "You were, you were kind of, you were the only game in town," and I said, "Well, "I didn't think that then, and frankly, I don't think that now," but I've learned a lot since then that lead me to believe there was less going on elsewhere than I thought, at the time.

Clifford Chanin: Well, that leads to this next question, which is, you know, the retrospective sense of what was being done pre-9/11, is that it was principally considered a law enforcement problem, and post-9/11, it becomes a military and a global problem. Do you accept that assessment, and if you do, is it a flawed way of looking at what we did in those times?
Mary Jo White: From my perspective, again with the caveat from what I just said, uh, I didn't think it was being handled, international terrorism was being handled as a law enforcement matter. I thought we were one sort of tool in the arsenal when it made sense. There's some, been some sort of critiques that, you know, we wanted to do everything as a, you know, as a criminal case.

Absolutely not true. We were asked to do cases from time to time and we did them if we could do them. I thought it was a matter for the military long before 9/11. I mean, long before 9/11. I mean, you know, when, I mean, clearly, you know, shortly after the Day of Terror trial was done. We'd learned enough in those two cases and investigations to make me think, "This is war. We are at war, war has been declared on us, and this is primarily a matter for the military." So I had a very different perspective, perhaps, than was the reality, you know, globally speaking of the, the U.S. government globally.

Clifford Chanin: Post-9/11, you were still U.S. attorney for several months after the 9/11 attack happens. What was your sense of that? Obviously, the disaster is a disaster, but, you know, was this, was this even greater than you had feared it could be, or was this somehow just the next step in this awful, awful spiral?

Mary Jo White: No, this was greater. I mean, I think, and I think it's Colin Powell who said this was a failure of imagination on the part of even those of us who took the risk most seriously, I think. I mean, for example, I think we all thought, involving these matters, investigations, and cases, that the World Trade Center was, remained a target. It would likely be bombed again or certainly attempted to be bombed again. But attacks on the level that occurred on 9/11, I certainly didn't envision that and I don't think anybody, anybody did. You know, it's, it's qualitatively not so different in the sense that, you know, I've already said, I thought we were at war, war had been declared on us. But this was kind of proof positive of that beyond my imagination, as well.
Clifford Chanin: Did you think, seeing what was happening here, that there would be a role for the... your office or other U.S. attorney's office in sort of prosecuting this, or was this just so far beyond that at that point?

Mary Jo White: You know, again, my view, and clearly after 9/11, was, this is a matter for the military. You know, I think there's a lot of misinformation out there about, for example, if there were to be more civilian criminal trials, were we fighting to have them in New York versus Washington? That's not true. We basically, you know, cooperated in the effort to get all of the expertise to Washington, including the New York FBI, some of the intelligence information, some of the assistance went to Washington, where it could all be in one place.

I mean, one, one of the things that I did find-- and this was very early on-- quite frightening, frankly, given the nature of this risk and danger, was something called "the wall," which was basically, you know, you've heard of FISA lately, right? Essentially, information being collected on the intelligence side of the House couldn't be shared with the law enforcement side of the House until the attorney general declared that you were actually going to bring a criminal case.

So some of my assistants probably knew more about al-Qaeda than maybe anybody in the United States, as it turns out, but they couldn't learn what that information was that was being gathered by the intelligence community. And so, you know, how do you hope to sort of connect the dots when that doesn't happen?

Clifford Chanin: You warned about that at one point.

Mary Jo White: I did, I warned about that in 1995, actually, because it was basically, I mean, understandable but wrong, I think. You, you certainly want to safeguard the ability to get the FISA warrants, you know, to collect intelligence, but I think the Justice Department was too conservative about the litigation risk of that. There was nothing in the law that said you couldn't share information with the law enforcement
The law just said you can't, you know, use it as a subterfuge to collect, you know, information. You can't mix the intelligence and the law enforcement side. So I did urge that the wall be brought, you know, down, as, as far down as it could be down. And really that did not happen till after 9/11.

Clifford Chanin: Well, post-9/11, as well, though, there's this new model of prosecution-- if that's even what to call it-- with this resort to the military tribunal, Guantanamo, and so on. And your views of that evolved over the course of time.

Mary Jo White: They did. My view after 9/11 was that-- and really based on the experience we'd had in these other cases I've mentioned already, how close some of the calls were, I thought, having to pull the plug versus having to turn over information required to be turned over under the discovery rules, that once you were, in effect, in the caves in Afghanistan and getting all kinds of additional information, and you had live detainees in Guantanamo-- that those obligations in the civilian criminal courts would be impossible to satisfy.

Moussaoui was obviously tried in DC, and at least the orders that were handed down satisfied that obligation, at least according to the, you know, the DC courts. So I actually advocated—I mean, President Bush announced shortly after 9/11 the creation of the military tribunals-- that Moussaoui be tried in a military tribunal. Unfortunately, the procedures weren't built out for the military tribunals for, you know, really more than a year later, I think.

Having watched the-- pardon me-- having watched the military tribunals work, however, I've kind of come full circle back to the, the best place to deal with, you know, captured terrorists, at least, where you have the evidence, is in civilian criminal courts, because, I mean, we, we all sort of have followed, or many of us have followed, you know, KKM, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is still in Guantanamo, as are others, awaiting trial years and years and years later.
00:44:55 The defense attorneys, the military defense attorneys, have quit, basically. I mean, there's just, you know, complete dysfunction. Bin Laden's driver was actually convicted in a military tribunal and sentenced to time served. You know, again, my philosophy in these cases, as I mentioned before, is, you prosecute as vigorously as you can every single player involved in the terrorist plot, and so that, you know, that the, the guy who provides the rental cars, if he's subject to a life sentence, he should be given a life sentence for deterrence purposes.

So, so they've not been effective. I mean, they've been grossly ineffective, I think, the military tribunals. Whereas I think the criminal, the civilian criminal justice system has been quite effective.

00:45:40 Clifford Chanin: Where do you see-- I mean, it's, it's now years after 9/11. We're coming up on 17 years. So we've been at war for all of this time, extending into various directions. There have been homegrown plots and prosecutions, successful in many of these cases. But where do you see the risk that you first perceived in these original cases? Is it much greater than it was? Is it now spread to more people who pose that risk? How do you see this, this horizon now?

00:46:13 Mary Jo White: I think it's equally dangerous. I think it's equally long-term. I think it's more diffuse. I think I described in that speech I gave in... certainly before 9/11, al-Qaeda being kind of the joint venture of various terrorist organizations. So, it wasn't, like, here's al-Qaeda. You had, you know, other branches that were sort of, you know, part of that.

So there was some diffuseness even then, but now what you have are people who want to... They're wanna-bes, in effect. I mean, they're inspired by sort of the terrorist doctrine. You know, look, I worry about the homegrown terrorists. I worry about, um, the danger that's posed from lower-level attacks—the suicide bombers, you know, the car in, you know, Times Square. You know, I think one of the things that may have helped us after 9/11, obviously, we enhanced security in all kinds of ways that, you know, badly needed to be enhanced: FBI, JTTF, NYPD. Great job.
00:47:16 But you also had at least al-Qaeda, you know, who always were very much into symbols, attacking symbols and sort of one-upping themselves. So if you have to do something greater than 9/11, that is a lot harder to do. If instead, you have a more diffuse risk, with players you don't control under any kind of hierarchy, under any kind of discipline, you know, then you can have, you know, multiple attacks occurring on a lesser scale, but with more frequency and I think with great potential to really wreak havoc with the, you know, the world's psyche, certainly the American psyche. So, so I, you know, I... My sort of bottom line is, you know, we just can't be... It's-- the risk evolves. It's more diffuse, but never can we be complacent about it.

00:48:03 Clifford Chanin: Right, but you're, you seem, on the other hand, quite confident in the expanded capacities of law enforcement through this cooperation among the different agencies and with the intelligence community.

Mary Jo White: I think it's improved. I think it's enhanced. It's significantly enhanced. But I mean, it's, you know, you've also got... This is a global threat, and so... I mentioned before sort of the world coalition being so important to fighting and combating international terrorism. If you've got one country, you know, where, that's not part of that coalition, that's gonna be where your next plot occurs. So, we certainly don't have perfect, comprehensive cooperation globally.

00:48:40 Clifford Chanin: Let's see if there are some questions out in the audience. And I'm just gonna ask everybody to wait for the microphone to come out, 'cause the microphone isn't out yet. Well, then we won't wait for the microphone to come out. Oh, here comes a microphone. Let's start on this side where Harmony is, so it's closer. Anyone over here? Going once, going... right here. Gentleman right there.

00:49:12 Man: Hi. Are you at liberty to talk about Ali Mohammed at all, and his relationship to the various cases?
Mary Jo White: I'm really not. I mean, I apologize, but I, you know, there are things in my brain that I still can't talk about, and that's one, beyond obviously, what's public, which you already know, I'm sure. Yeah.

Clifford Chanin: Quick one. Let's... Charlie, one second. Hang on, wait for the mic.

Mary Jo White: And identify yourself, Charlie, so you're...

Man: Charlie Maikish. I was the... (clears throat): director in '93 of the Trade Center.

Mary Jo White: And invaluable to us in the 1993 trial.

Charlie Maikish: Thank you for saying that. Mary Jo, putting both hats on, the S.E.C. hat and the hat having to do with, you know, combating terrorism, and the question that was often, often asked by the Mossad, which was to cut off the head of the snake by, by starving it to death financially, can you comment on the issue of, you know, financial privacy as versus the ability to track and, and seize funds that are being used in terrorist activities?

Mary Jo White: Yeah, I mean, I think, a couple of points on that. I mean, one, I think we probably did less on that front than we should have before 9/11. On the other hand, it costs very little. Certainly, you talk about the, you know, the '93 bomb, what, less than $10,000 or something? I mean, you know, Yousef again commented that if he had more money, he indeed would've succeeded in toppling the two towers into each other in '93.

So I think it's, you know, it's, it's essential to very aggressively pursue all sources of funding for terrorist operations. And again, back to my
disruption point, I mean, even grabbing some funds of not huge amounts might disrupt a plot, gives you a chance to prevent it.

00:51:02 You'll find, well, certainly in my case, I much more err on the side of security and national security than I do privacy. I mean, I think it's a matter of survival for us. So, you know, you need and you have safeguards, you know, in the law for privacy, you should have that. But I worry about that from, you know, electronic surveillance, you know, the, the controversy there, as well. You know, whereas, you know, the, the... How do you balance the privacy interests with the needs of law enforcement and intelligence to get the information they need to get?

Having lived through these cases and feeling the way I do about the, the, how dangerous it is, I err on the side of being aggressive and collecting that information.

00:51:47 Clifford Chanin: You know, one of the things this suggests, though, and you, you write about this elsewhere, is that, as the prosecutions went public with the evidence and to the degree that they did, the way it was gathered, al-Qaeda studied these cases and learned about how their vulnerabilities had been exposed and exploited by these investigations. So they are all learning organization, as well, in your sense of it.

00:52:09 Mary Jo White: No, no question about that, I mean, I think... I think they probably learned less from those cases than has been written about and, and, sort of, opined about, but they clearly did learn from those... And again, that, that is a price of those cases. I mean, I think that's why you will, you know, hear a lot of folks arguing for, you really ought to be interrogating on the intelligence side, learning what you need to learn to prevent attacks, and not exposing, you know, what you know, so that they can learn, you know, in a civilian criminal, you know, trial. I mean, you know, it's a balance.

00:52:43 Clifford Chanin: I'll look over here, this gentleman there.
Man: Hello, I'm Andy Van Salas, and as a lawyer, I was glad to hear you talk about the need to be fair in making adequate discovery of criminal evidence. I'm wondering, who makes the decisions on certain other tactics, tactical considerations in these prosecutions?

For example, if there are special administrative measures that have to be imposed on the way defense counsel can function. Was that something that you would involve yourself in, or would it be the kind of thing that Mr. Fitzpatrick would decide on his own, or did it come from higher up, from the intelligence community, or something else?

Mary Jo White: I certainly was involved in those decisions. And this is (coughs) the so-called SAMs, basically. I mean, one, one of our, you know, grave concerns was information being passed, as you know, through attorneys, you know, to the outside world in a way that could signal to others, you know, sort of how to do, when to do, you know, the next attack. I don't mean to... I'm oversimplifying it a little by saying that.

Look, I mean, one of the things that I feel, you know, more generically--so I was involved in those. I approved of those, I thought they were necessary. And I understand, you know, how severe they were. I mean, I guess that's the best way to say that. I mean, one of the reasons that I, you know, basically favored the military tribunals after 9/11, the reasons I said, I just didn't see how you could, without lowering the bar on our criminal justice system, I just didn't see how you could satisfy any longer, knowing how difficult it was before 9/11, you know, the rules of fairness and our criminal discovery rules and successfully prosecute.

And the last thing you want to do is become people we're not when we pursue these cases, and so, but it's excruciating. I mean, I will say, I mean, it is a... I mean, you have to do what you're permitted to do lawfully in order to protect yourself and, and the national security, but you've always got to have in your mind: What are you doing to fairness? What are you doing to the system? And I'm not gonna pretend those are easy calls.
Clifford Chanin: In the middle there.

Woman: Jule Weiss, not a lawyer, but employed at the World Trade Center from 1981 till, uh, 9/11. My question is, when the Bush administration, supposedly, and I don't know the information, had gotten warning that something was about to happen, were there other arenas that were also aware of those warnings, or were they not really important enough for-- to pay attention to?

Mary Jo White: Before 9/11, you mean?

Jule Weiss: Before 9/11, because you had already... I mean, from what you're saying, you were very aware of the threats, in general.

Mary Jo White: In, certainly in general, there's no question. I mean, look, I'll tell you from my perspective, again, there's been a lot written and a lot of findings on this that have much more information than certainly I had before 9/11, and frankly, that I know now in terms of who knew what when.

But, you know, approaching 9/11, and again, remember that wall I talked about? There could be information being gathered on the intelligence side that, you know, myself and the assistants in the office would never hear about, some in the FBI would not hear about. We were aware there was a level of concern, but that's about all we knew. We didn't have any, you know, specific information. I will tell you that when I was in the command center after 9/11-- the FBI command center, I was there for about six weeks after 9/11-- um, and the materials on Moussaoui, you know, the so-called 19th hijacker or whatever, um, came into the command center. I knew absolutely nothing about him, neither did anyone else in our office, and the New York FBI didn't know about him.
And I also saw that they didn't seek a warrant, you know, either a search warrant or, you know, a FISA warrant, and I know-- and again, I'm not suggesting it would've prevented 9/11, I mean, I'm not at all suggesting that-- but I know what would've happened if we'd had that information: we would've gotten a warrant, and we'd have learned a lot more before 9/11.

So, you know, I'm not a person that points fingers at this. I am a person who, since 1995, has said, "You've got to have all the information known to our government, you know, in one place and being looked at by the minds, you know, who know what they're looking at." And clearly there, we didn't have that before 9/11.

Clifford Chanin: Let me read from this article you wrote in 2001, 'cause it really summarizes where we were then, and I want you to contrast it with where you think we are now.

Mary Jo White: And this is before 9/11?

Cliff Chanin: This is before 9/11.

Mary Jo White: Right.

Clifford Chanin: So this is early 2001. "Our criminal justice system..." And this is about the prosecution of terrorism cases. "Our criminal justice system is simultaneously respected and feared because it's known as a system that cannot be fixed or corrupted. We must make sure that it continues to function fairly and effectively in cases involving international terrorism."

Has our reputation-- which I think you characterized very well in that time-- has it come through with the same qualities in light of everything that's happened, whether it's the Guantanamo issues, the military
tribunals, the rendition, and all those other things that have happened outside of the criminal justice system, but that the criminal justice system could not stop, has it changed, do you think, this perception of the U.S. justice system?

Mary Jo White: Um, and what I was talking about, I don't... Well... (stammers) I mean, to some degree, yes—I think, to some degree, yes. Um, and it kind of depends on who we're talking about. Who I was talking about there was, really, kind of the terrorists that are looking upon our system of criminal justice. I don't think that's changed.

In fact, I think, you know, one of the detainees in Guantanamo who was an East Africa embassy bombing defendant, uh... I happened to be a monitor for the Defense Department, after I left office, of the conditions in Guantanamo. And this defendant had just been moved up to the Southern District of New York to be tried and ultimately convicted in that case, and kind of the word around Guantanamo is, "You really don't want to go to New York," you know. It's not as good a facility as New York and you'll never see the light of day after you go to New York.

And, you know, so I think the answer is, you know, you know, again, we've been through what we've been through with the military tribunals. There were no cases for a while. You had some nicks, I think, based on some of the material support, terrorism cases, but I think it's still a respected and feared system. And it should be.

Clifford Chanin: One more. Over there, please.

Man: (clears throat) You mentioned that a, at least, overarching theme for the terrorists would be to bring down our government, but it seems like most of the attacks have really just been maximizing publicity and loss of life. They're not really designed to bring down the government. So if, if it's really, that's what it is, they're just trying to make a big stir, how do you ever really think we can prevent... You know, I know you can prevent some, but... There's just no way to prevent them all. I mean, I
know I come in from New Jersey on the train. It'd be very easy for someone to step on that train...

Mary Jo White: Yeah.

Man: ...with a bomb and set it off and, you know, I get scared every day I do that, but how do you, how do you see that happening in terms of stopping that, and is that really the case? They don't care about the government, just maximum carnage, if you will?

Mary Jo White: I mean, I think there's an ultimate objective that, you know, that, you know, includes undermining/toppling our government at the end of the day, but, you know, there are lots of steps that are smaller than that, obviously, that we worry about every day.

Do I think we can stop every... No. I mean, I think we do everything we can... And look, we use every tool. I mean, including-- not law enforcement, not the military, not intelligence-- but, you know, root causes, that's a whole nother program, where, you know, we can't really get into in any detail tonight, but at the end of the day, I don't think you can stop every attack. I think we're a lot more secure than we were before 9/11, without any question, but I think, you know, to lower our, you know, our bar of vigilance, huge mistake, and even not lowering that bar of vigilance, I don't think we can stop every attack. I think we have to respond to... I mean, I was commenting earlier, I mean, one of the most remarkable things, I thought, and I thought it in 1993 about the 1993 bombing, was how, obviously, six innocent people lost their lives, and an unborn baby lost his life in the bombing, but not a single person evacuating the Trade Center died.

You know, how can you not have a heart attack, a fatal heart attack? And so, the resiliency of New Yorkers-- and I don't confine it to just New York- - you know, in responding to that attack, and frankly, in responding to 9/11, is what we've got to, you know, always maintain and have, I think, but I think we're in a much better position worldwide, you know, in preventing, you know, more and more of these attacks, but, you know,
it's a, it's a constant, you know, battle. I'd like to say it'll be over, you know, in my lifetime, but I don't see it.

01:02:50 Clifford Chanin: Well, that's a mixed conclusion, but I, um...

(laughter)

Mary Jo White: (coughs) I'm not sure how mixed it is, but yeah, okay.

Clifford Chanin: But it's really been remarkable to go back to the beginnings of all of this, and to think about, it's 25 years and you have bridged those 25 years in critical positions to see this, and to watch how it's evolved. I mean, I think we owe you, all of us, you know, a debt of gratitude for just how effective you and your colleagues were in pursuing these cases and in establishing standards that then spread throughout the system that allowed for the attention and the approach that, at least as best they could, kept us safe against these things.

01:03:29 So, with that said, please join me in thanking Mary Jo White.

(applause)

Mary Jo White: Thank you. Okay, thank you.